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POST-CRAWFORD: TIME TO LIBERALIZE THE
SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSIBILITY OF A TESTIFYING
WITNESS'S PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Lynn McLain'
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are a juror in a criminal trial for sexual child abuse. The
alleged victim, a quivering five-year old, testifies for the' prosecution; however,
his speech is halting, his manner unsure, and much of his testimony is given in
whispered one-syllable replies to the prosecutor's leading questions.! There are
no other eyewitnesses to the alleged abuse. 2
Despite compelling medical testimony and photographic evidence of the
boy's tom anus/ you cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is

• Professor of Law and Dean Joseph Curtis Faculty Fellow, University of Baltimore School of Law;
B.A, University of Pennsylvania, 1971; J.D., Duke Law School, 1974. The author served as a
Special Reporter for the Rules Committee of the Court of Appeals of Maryland during its evidence
codification project. She thanks Tom Lininger and Max Oppenheimer for their comments; Pia
Gomez, Esq., Erika Schissler, J.D., 2005, and April Renee Randall for their research assistance; and
Barbara Coyle Jones for her unparalleled administrative assistance.
I See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1995).
At trial AT., then 6 112 years old, was the Government's first witness. For the most
part, her direct testimony consisted of one- and two-word answers to a series of
leading questions. Cross-examination took place over two trial days. The defense
asked A.T. 348 questions. On the first day AT. answered all the questions posed to
her on general, background subjects. The next day there was no testimony, and the
prosecutor met with AT. When cross-examination of AT. resumed, she was
questioned about those conversations but was reluctant to discuss them. Defense
counsel then began questioning her about the allegations of abuse, and it appears she
was reluctant at many points to answer. As the trial judge noted, however, some of
the defense questions were imprecise or unclear. The judge expressed his concerns
with the examination of AT., observing there were lapses of as much as 40-55
seconds between some questions and the answers and that on the second day of
examination, the witness seemed to be losing concentration. The trial judge stated,
"We have a very difficult situation here."
Id. See infra notes 101 and 126. See also United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 87 (8th Cir.
1980) ("At trial Lucy [the nine-year-old victim] was unable to repeat the statements she had made
to Officer Marshall and Dr. Hopkins although she was able to provide some facts .to support her
earlier statements."). See generally JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES §§ 1.2-1.7, 1.29, 6.1-6.22 (3d ed. 1997) (describing and explaining difficulties faced by
child witnesses).
2 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,60 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("Child abuse is one of the
most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses
except the victim.").
3 See, e.g., C. M. Mahady-Smith, Comment, The Young Victim as Witness for the Prosecution:
Another Form ofAbuse?, 89 DICK. L. REv. 721,721-22 (1985) (reporting the dropping ofa sexual
abuse case due to inadmissibility ofa child's statements identifying his abuser, when the three-year
old boy had gonorrhea of the mouth, penis, and rectum); J~ckie Powder, Judge's Ban of Social
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the abuser when you have only the child's trial testimony on that point. You
would like to hear when, to whom, and under what circumstances the child
reported the alleged abuse in order to help you evaluate the defense's contention
that the child's mother has coached him to fabricate the claim against the
defendant.
What you do not know is that although the prosecution is eager to present
evidence of the child's prior statements, consistent with his trial testimony, the
United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Tome v. United States4 has read
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(I)(Bi to prevent the prosecution's offering
those statements as substantive evidence. As a result of that decision, the
statements will also be inadmissible even for the limited purpose of helping to
evaluate the credibility of a child, if there is a serious risk that the out-of-court
statements would be used on the issue of guilt or innocence. 6
Moreover, after the Court's March 2004 decision in Crawford v.
Washington,7 which redesigned the landscape of Confrontation ClauseS analysis,
other avenues of substantive admissibility for the child's prior statements-the
excited utterance hearsay exception,9 the residual "catch-all" hearsay exception, 10
Worker's Testimony in Child Abuse Case Upsets Investigators, BALT. SUN, Aug. 9, 1992, at 6B (the
stepfather of a five-year old Maryland girl who contracted gonorrhea was acquitted when the State
was not permitted to prove that the child had described her stepfather having sexual intercourse
with her to a police officer).
4513 U.S. 150 (1995).
5 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(I)(B) provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (B)
consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive ....
6 See United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding it is reversible error to
admit, for corroboration purposes, statements not admissible as substantive evidence); United
States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 516-18 (4th Cir. 1995). See also infra note 129 and text
accompanying note 141.
7541 U.S. 36 (2004).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him .... "). This right is applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See generally, Chris Hutton, Sir
Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re-Vamps Two Decades of Confrontation Clause
Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REv. 41 (2005); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting
Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747 (2005); Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington:
A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REv. 569 (2004); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511 (2005).
9 Compare, e.g., People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding an excited
utterance by 911 caller was "testimonial" and inadmissible absent compliance with Crawford) with
People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2004) (holding exited utterances by
domestic violence victim in 911 call were nontestimonial and would be admissible even if declarant
did not testify at trial). See generally Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In
Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1171 (2002); Hutton, supra note 8, at 66-71 (collecting postCrawford child abuse cases).
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or the states' "tender years" hearsay exceptionll-are all in jeopardy unless the
child testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement. The combination of Tome and Crawford has been a "one-two punch"
for child abuse prosecutions.
Yet Crawford reasserts that when the witness testifies at trial and can be
cross-examined by the accused regarding those statements, there is no
Confrontation Clause obstacle to admitting the witness's prior statements as
substantive evidence. 12 Therefore, given Crawford's emphasis on requiring that
the accused have the ability to cross-examine the declarant about his or her
statement, now is the ideal time to amend the rules of evidence to overrule Tome
so as to permit the substantive use of any of a witness's prior statements,
consistent with his or her trial testimony, that would be helpful to the fact-finder.
Although the need for such an amendment may be starkest in child abuse
prosecutions, the amendment will be of benefit in all types of cases.
Part II of this article provides background information regarding Crawford
and the changes it has wrought regarding the constitutional parameters on the
admission of hearsay. Part III discusses the pre-Federal Rules of Evidence
common law regarding the substantive admissibility of a witness's prior
consistent statements, the curious adoption of an underinclusive Federal Rule of
Evidence ("Rule") 801(d)(l)(B), and the pre-Crawford case law construing the
Rule, particularly the Court's decision in Tome. The Tome majority read the
Rule to require that a witness's statement must have preceded the witness's
alleged motive to lie at trial in order to be admissible under the Rule. 13
Although the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules determined prior to
Crawford that the need for an amendment of Rule 80l(d)(1)(B), which was
suggested by Chief Judge Bullock of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina,14 did not justify the costs associated with any
10 FED. R. EVID. 807. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-65 (citing with disapproval cases that had
affmned the admission of testimonial statements under this exception or its predecessors, former
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5)). The Tome majority suggested that the child
victim's statements, although inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(l)(B), might be admissible under the
catch-all (then Rule 803(24)), if they were shown to be reliable. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S.
150, 166 (1995). That door has been closed by Crawford, at least as to testimonial statements when
the declarant does not testify at trial and Crawford'S requirements have not otherwise been met.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
II See State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005) (holding it is reversible error to admit under
Maryland's statutory "tender years" hearsay exception a social worker's testimony as to children's
out-of-court "testimonial" statements which were made in the presence of a police detective, when
the children did not testify). See generally Lynn McLain, Children Are Losing Maryland's
"Tender Years" War, 27 U. BALT. L. REv. 21 (1997) (discussing Maryland's statute and citing
"tender years" statutes of thirty-six other states).
12 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
14 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., 4 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 801.02[4][b] at 80133 & n.31 (8th ed. 2002) ("Persuasive arguments have been made that Rule 80l(d)(l)(B) should be
amended to provide that a prior consistent statement is admissible for its truth whenever it is
admissible to rehabilitate [a] witness."); Frank W. Bullock, Jr. & Steven Gardner, Prior Consistent
Statements and the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 509 (1997); Daniel S. Capra,
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amendment/ 5 Crawford has raised the stakes considerably. Part IV argues that
post-Crawford is the ideal time to revive and refine Judge Bullock's proposal that
Rule 801(d)(1)(B)16 should be amended. The amendment should permit the
substantive use (subject to the court's exercise of discretion under Rule 403) of
all of a witness's prior c<?nsistent statements that would be. helpful to the factfinder in assessing the credibility of the witness's trial testimony given whatever
method of impea.chment of the witness had occurred. That test, like the test of
helpfulness of lay or expert opinion evidence under Rules 701 17 and 702,18 ought
to be a flexible one; there should be no hard and fast rule requiring that an
admissible prior consistent statement precede an alleged impeaching fact.
Because the current Rule has a particularly devastating effect on the prosecution
of sexual child abuse and other sexual assaults, in the event this amendment to
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is not adopted, Part IV argues that the Federal Rules of
Evidence should be amended to include, like the evidence laws of numerous
states,19 a similar provision specifically admitting an alleged victi~ of sexual
assault's prior consistent statements reporting the assault.
II. THE POST -eRA WFORD LANDSCAPE

Before Crawford, the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Ohio v. RobertiO
and its progeny applied the Confrontation Clause so as to establish the outer
limits on admissibility of hearsay evidence against a criminal accused, regardless
of whether the out-of-court statements were "testimonial" or "nontestimonial."
Under Roberts, the Confrontation Clause and the rule against hearsay were
conflated, so hearsay evidence that was sufficiently reliable21 and necessary22
Memorandum to Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (Nov. 1,2003) (on file with the author)
(discussing proposal by Chief Judge Bullock, who acted as liaison from the Standing Rules
Committee to the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, to amend Rule 801(d)(I)(B) so as to
provide, as drafted by the Reporter, Professor Capra, that "a statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is ... consistent with the declarant's testimony and is admissible,
subject to Rule 403, to rehabilitate the declarant's credibility as a witness.").
15 E-mail from Daniel S. Capra, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, to Lynn
McLain, Professor of Law, Baltimore School of Law (the Committee "found that the benefits of an
amendment did not outweigh the costs") (Mar. 30,2005,10:22 EST) (on file with author).
16 The Federal Rules of Evidence apply in federal cases, but most states also have adopted codes
based on the federal rules. See LYNN McLAIN, 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL xvii
n.2 (2d ed. 2001). See generally SALTZBURG, supra note 14 (should the federal rule be amended,
those states likely would revisit their corollary rules as well).
17 E.g., United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 926-27 (4th Cir. 1997) (fmding lay witness was
properly allowed to give the opinion that the defendant was pictured in surveillance photograph,
when there was a basis for concluding that witness's identification would be superior to jury's).
18 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (adopting a flexible,
multiple-factor test for admission of expert scientific evidence).
19 See infra notes 160-64.
20
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
21 Id. at 66. Reliability could be shown either (1) because the hearsay fell within a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception or (2) by "a showing of particularized guarantees oftrustworthiness." Id.
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was admissible, even thougll the defendant most often had no opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. 23 Roberts applied the same analysis to testimonial
and nontestimonial out-of-court statements. Crawford, on the other hand,
construes the Confrontation Clause so as to require the opportunity for crossexamination, rather than some other gauge of reliability, but applies the Clause
only to testimonial statements.
Under Crawford, the declarant is a "witness against" the accused within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment if the out-of-court statement was
"testimonial.,,24 In that event, the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of the
statement as substantive evidence25 for the prosecution, unless either (1) the
defendant can cross-examine the declarant at trial,26 or (2) the declarant is
unavailable to testify at trial, but the defendant earlier had an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant about the statement/7 or (3) the declarant's
unavailability to testify at the trial was procured by the defendant, in which case
the defendant has forfeited the ability to complain that he or she cannot crossexamine the declarant. 28
If the declarant is available to testify at the trial and the accused has the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness-declarant, the Confrontation Clause
guarantee has been met fully.29 Although the courts recognized this principle
22Id. at 65 ("[T]he Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity."). A declarant's unavailability
to testify at trial satisfies the requirement of necessity. Id. In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)
and United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,395-96 (1986), the necessity prong was met by the fact
that, even if the declarants had testified at trial, their testimony could not have duplicated the
circumstances providing probative value to their out-of-court excited utterances, White, 502 U.S.
346, statements made for purposes of obtaining medical treatment, id. at 356, or their statements
during and in furtherance ofa conspiracy, Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395-96.
23 E.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); BoUIjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
24 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,50-51,68 (2004).
25 "The [Confrontation] Clause ... does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other
than establishing the truth of the matter asserted," such as for impeachment of the declarant. Id. at
59n.9.
26/d.

at 68.
at 62 ("[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation
claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of
determining reliability."). See generally Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of
Chutzpah, 31 ISR. L. REv. 508 (1997); Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Blog, (Dec. 14,
2004), http://confrontationright.blogspot.coml2004_12_01_confrontationright_archive.html.
29 E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162
(1970); United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 45-46 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying this principle
in the context of the admission of a testifying witness's prior consistent statements). But see
Richard D. Friedman, Prior Statements of a Witness: A Nettlesome Corner of the Hearsay Thicket,
1995 SUP. CT. REv. 277 (arguing that the admission of extrinsic evidence ofa witness's statements,
generally consistent with, but more detailed than the witness's trial testimony, poses confrontation
problems). Professor Friedman's objection, however, is answered at present by United States v.
Owens in which Justice Scalia, writing for the majority of six, reiterated, "The Confrontation
Clause guarantees only an opportunity for cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent the defense may wish." 484 U.S. 554, 559
27/d.

28/d.
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before Crawford,30 it assumes more preeminence in a post-Crawford world in
which Confrontation Clause analysis contemplates cross-examination only, rather
than any other mechanism or test for ensuring reliability of the out-of-court
statement. 31
Post-Crawford, then, the admissibility of hearsay under the Confrontation
Clause turns on (1) whether the out-of-court statement was "testimonial,,32 and, if
so, then (2) whether the opportunity to cross-examine was either (a) provided to
the accused or (b) forfeited by the accused's conduct that made the declarant
unavailable to testify. Crawford strongly suggests, though it leaves a decision on
the issue for another day/3 that the Court is inclined to hold that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to "nontestimonial" statements.
Crawford teaches that the admissibility of nontestimonial out-of-court
statements is circumscribed only by the law of hearsay, as the states (or, in
federal cases, the evidence rules adopted by the Court and Congress) choose to
define it. 34 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, states, "Where nontestimonial
hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the
States flexibility in their development of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as
would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause
scrutinyaltogether.,,35
The startling idea that admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay, even when
the declarant does not testify at trial, would then be governed simply by the
applicable evidence rules, left Crawford'S readers asking what, if anything,
would establish the constitutional parameters on the admission of such hearsay.
The answer is provided in Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in White v.
Illinois, 36 joined by Justice Scalia, presaging Crawford. Justice Thomas states:
Although the historical concern with trial by affidavit and anonymous
accusers does reflect concern with the reliability of the evidence against a
defendant, the [Confrontation] Clause makes no distinction based on the
reliability of the evidence presented .... Reliability is more properly a due
process concern. There is no reason to strain the text of the Confrontation
Clause to provide criminal defendants with a protection [regarding reliability
of the evidence against them] that due process already provides them. 37

(1988). The Court found no error in'the substantive admission under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(I)(C) of an out-of-court identification by an assault victim, when the victim was sworn as a
witness at trial and subject to cross-examination, but due to brain damage from the assault had no
memory of the basis for the identification. Id. at 564.
30 E.g., Green, 399 U.S, at 162.
31 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 ("Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.").
32Id.
33 Id. at 60-61
34Id. at 61.
35Id. at 68.
36
502 U.S. 346 (1992),
37 Id. at 363-64.
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Thus, the Court likely will hold in a future case that evidence rules regarding
nontestimonial hearsay will be restrained not by the Confrontation Clause, but by
the due process clause, which provides the constitutional guarantee that a
judgment cannot be based on unreliable hearsay.38 Courts have traditional~
applied this due process guarantee in their review of administrative proceedings 9
and probation revocation proceedings.40 Therefore, the reliability analysis of
Ohio v. Roberts and its progeny (minus the necessity analysis) will continue to
apply to the question of what nontestimonial hearsay evidence can support a
judgment, but will do so under the due process clause, which historically has
been less restrictive 41 than had the Confrontation Clause cases pre-Crawford.
If this prediction proves to be correct, the rules of evidence constitutionally
could permit the admission of nontestimonial hearsay of nontestifying declarants
as long as it meets the due process reliability standard. As to this category of
out-of-court statements, even a general rule like that of the federal Administrative
Procedure Act that only "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence"
must be excluded and judgments must be based on "reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence".42 would be a permissible choice. 43 Such an approach harks

See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (finding procedural due process
requirements were met when an agency based its decision on reliable hearsay experts' reports);
Motor Vehicle Admin. v. McDorman, 772 A.2d 309 (Md. 2001) (holding an administrative
agency's decision can be based on reliable hearsay); Bergstein v. State, 588 A.2d 779 (Md. 1991)
(holding that an admission of reliable hearsay at a hearing to revoke a person's conditional release
from a mental health facility did not violate due process, even though the admission would have
been inadmissible at a trial).
39 E.g., Richardson, 402 U.S. 389 (holding that procedural due process requirements were met
when agency based its decision on a reliable hearsay experts' reports); Gimbel v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 872 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1989) ("It is well settled that hearsay may
constitute substantial evidence in administrative hearings if factors assuring the underlying
reliability and probative value of the evidence are present."); Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 654 So.2d 292 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1995) (hearsay evidence
admissible to supplement or explain admissible evidence); Spreadbury v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 745
So.2d 1204, 1208-09 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (hearsay evidence may be admissible in administrative
proceedings, as long as it is "of the type that reasonable persons would rely upon"); Motor Vehicle
Admin. v. McDorman, 772 A.2d 309 (Md. 2001) (administrative agency's decision can be based on
reliable hearsay); De Carlo v. Comm'n of Soc. Servs., 131 A.D.2d 31, 34-35 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) ("It is now well established that an agency can prove its case through hearsay evidence, so
long as it is believable, relevant and probative.") (citations omitted).
40 E.g., Bailey v. State, 612 A.2d 288 (Md. 1992).
41 See, e.g., Richardson, 402 U.S. at 398-401 (discussing admissibility of physician's records and
reports in an administrative hearing regarding social security disability claims).
42
5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994). See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 1O-213(b)-(c) (2004 Rep!.
Vol.) (evidence not excludable simply because it is hearsay; rather, "probative evidence that
reasonable and prudent individuals commonly accept in the conduct of their affairs" is admissible).
43 See Richard D. Friedman, Reflections on the Brooklyn Conference, (Feb. 21, 2005),
http://confrontationright.blogspot.coml2005_02_0 1_confrontationright_archive.html. ("My own
feeling is that [after Crawfordj hearsay law-as opposed to confrontation law-should generally
become far less exclusionary and less rigid.").
38
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back to the Federal Advisory Committee's Preliminary Draft of March 1969,
which provided for the admissibility of hearsay having '''assurances of accuracy
not likely to be enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness, '" and framed
categories listed in Rule 803 mer~ as '''examples of statements, conforming
with the requirements of this rule. "
The constitutional caveat added by Crawford is that any testimonial
statements offered against a criminal accused must exceed the due process
standard. Crawford requires that either (I) the declarant testify and be subject to
cross-examination at trial, (2) the declarant be unavailable to testify at trial but
the accused had an earlier opportunity to cross-examine her about her statement,
or (3) the declarant be unavailable to testify at trial and the court find that the
accused procured her unavailability.45 Crawford necessitates the reevaluation of
the definitions and boundaries of the previously firmly established hearsay
exceptions, because even if a particular hearsay statement falls within one of
those exceptions, if the statement is ''testimonial'' and it is offered against a
criminal accused, it will be inadmissible unless the prosecution complies with
Crawford.
Given the first category of the three avenues for compliance with Crawford,
this article will begin reevaluation of the existing Federal Rules of Evidence with
Rule 801 (d)(1), regarding which prior statements of a testifying witness are
admissible as substantive evidence. Because the witness is testifying at the trial,
and Rule 801(d)(1) requires that she must be "subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement,''''6 the Confrontation Clause poses no barrier here,47
even ifher prior statements were testimonial. This article addresses one subset of
Rule 801(d)(I)(B), which delimits the substantive admissibility of a testifying
witness's out-of-court statements that are consistent with her testimony.
III. RULE 801(D)(1)(B)
Under the common law that was in effect just before the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness's prior statements that were consistent with
her testimony enjoyed no hearsay exception of their own. Rather, they were
admissible only for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the credibility of a
witness who had been impeached by the suggestion that the witness's memory
had slipped or that the witness was fabricating her testimony, and then only if
relevant for that purpose.48 Rule 801(d)(I)(B) made certain statements rebutting
the latter form of impeachment admissible as substantive evidence. Most postFederal Rules of Evidence cases in the lower courts have permitted the use of
statements not qualifying under the Rule, but nonetheless relevant to the

4 DAVID W. LoUiSELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 437, at 446 (1980).
See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
46 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
47 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
48 See infra Part II1.B.
44

45
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witness's credibility, for the limited purpose of rehabilitation only, and not as
substantive evidence.
.
A. The Confrontation Clause Poses No Bar to Admissibility of a Testifying
Witness's Prior Consistent Statements

By definition, in order for an out-of-court statement to be consistent with a
witness's trial testimony, the witness must also testify at trial and thus be subject
to cross-examination at trial. The Confrontation Clause, as most recently
construed in Crawford, thus poses no obstacle to the admission of a testifying
witness's prior consistent statements. 49 The opponent may simultaneously
contest the trustworthiness of the witness's prior consistent statements and the
declarant's trial testimony through cross-examination of the declarant at trial.
Similarly, as long as the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to crossexamination concerning the prior statement, neither the Confrontation Clause nor
Rule 801(d)(I)(B) precludes extrinsic proof, as by document or by testimony of
persons other than the declarant, of the declarant's prior consistent statements. 50
If other witnesses so testify, the opponent may cross-examine those witnesses as
to their own bias, accuracy of perception, memory, and any other matters
relevant to their credibility.
There are, however, reasons other than the Confrontation Clause to limit the
admissibility of a witness's prior consistent statements. We would rather hear
the witness testifying from a live memory-and be able to cross-examine her live

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
This procedure was followed in, for example, United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 609-10
(6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1992). See, e.g., United
States v. Hebeka, 25 F.3d 287, 291-92 (6th Cir. 1994) (The government proved the witness's
statement through extrinsic evidence after the witness had testified. "Every other circuit [except
the Seventh Circuit in West] which has addressed this issue permits third parties to testify about
another witness's prior consistent statement .... Where, as here, the requirements ofthe rule are
satisfied, the admission of a prior consistent statement through a third party on an important matter
in dispute at trial should be permitted.") (citing United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1099
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (listing six other circuits in accord); United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1576
n.7 (lIth Cir. 1992); United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 758 (1st Cir. 1989»; United States v.
Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding extrinsic proof of such statements was
proper after declarant had testified and been impeached at trial). See also United States v. Copes,
345 F.2d 723, 726 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding in a pre-Federal Rules of Evidence case that
admitting extrinsic proof of declarant's prior consistent statements when she had testified and been
cross-examined about the statements was not error). But see United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675,
686-87 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding it was harmless error to permit extrinsic proof of statement after
declarant had testified, but had not testified to statement; proof of statement must be elicited from
declarant on redirect or in prosecution's case in rebuttal, so that he or she will be "subject to crossexamination concerning the out-of-court declaration"). Professor Friedman argues, however, that
substantive admissibility of prior statements that are generally consistent but add detail should not
be permitted if the declarant does not assert these facts at trial because cross-examination will be
seriously hampered as to those facts. Friedman, supra note 29, at 287-301,305-10,321.
49

50
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memory-than simply be confined to what she said before. If her recollection is
complete, there is no need to resort to her earlier statements. To admit all of a
witness's prior consistent statements would consume a great deal of time and
yield no particular benefit. 51 Additionally, to routinely admit a witness's prior
consistent statements might encourage the manufacture of well-crafted
statements by unethical witnesses, parties, or counsel. 52

B. The Pre-Rule Common Law
Before the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, there was no
hearsay exception per se for prior consistent statements of a testifying witness.
For his or her statements to be admitted as substantive evidence, they had to meet
the requirements for some hearsay exception, such as that for excited utterances.
Under the applicable common law, prior consistent statements that did not fall
under such a hearsay exception could be admitted only for the limited purpose of
rehabilitating the credibility of a witness who had been impeached by an
opposing party.53 Of course, prior consistent statements were admissible for this
limited purpose of rehabilitation only when they were helpful to the fact-finder
because they logically rebutted the impeachment that had been undertaken.
There were three situations where this criterion often was met.
The first scenario arose when the witness was impeached by questions or
evidence suggesting that her testimony was inaccurate because her memory had
faded since the event in question. The proponent of her testimony then could
. prove her prior consistent statements made significantly closer to the event. 54

51 See FED. R. Evro. 801(d)(I) advisory committee's note (contrasting FED. R. Evro. 801(d)(I) with
UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) (1953), "which allows any out-of-court statement of a declarant who is present
at the trial and available for cross-examination" (emphasis added)).
52 See FED. R. Evro. 801(d)(I), advisory committee's note (stating an "unwillingness to
countenance the general use of prior prepared statements as substantive evidence"), cited in Tome
v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 162 (1995).
53 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 511-13 (chronicling evolution of common law rule
from the admission of a witness's prior consistent statements without limitation through early
1700's, to the admission for corroboration only, regardless whether declarant had been impeached,
and finally, to the admission only after an attack on witness's credibility in the early 1800s);
Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule
801 (d)(J)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and A New Proposal, 1987 BYU L. REv. 231, 234-42.
54 E.g., Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 516 n.47 (citing Applebaum v. American Export
lsbrandtsen Lines, 472 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1972); Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 198
n.6 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Keller, 145 F. Supp. 692, 695-97 (D.N.J. 1956); People v.
Basnett, 8 Cal. Rptr. 804, 810-11 (Ct. App. 1960); Thomas v. Ganezer, 78 A.2d 539, 542 (Conn.
1951); Openshaw v. Adams, 445 P.2d 663, 668-69 (Idaho 1968); Cross v. State, 86 A. 223, 227
(Md. 1912); People v. Mann, 212 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Slocinski, 197
A. 560, 562 (N.H. 1938); Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246, 250 (1878) [1879]; 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 47, at 178 n.18 (John W. Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("If the witness's accuracy of
memory is challenged, it seems clear common sense that a consistent statement made shortly after
the event and before he had time to forget, should be received in support.")); Michael H. Graham,
Prior Consistent Statements: Rule 801 (d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Critique and
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Second, where the opponent suggested that the witness was lying at the trial
due to her bias or improper motive, the courts routinely would admit the
witness's consistent statements made prior to the date that the alleged bias or
motive came into existence. 55 Post-motive statements that rebutted impeachment
were also admitted by a number of courts. 56
Third, if the impeachment was by proof of the witness's prior statement
inconsistent with her trial testimony (which could imply either faded memory or
subsequent fabrication), the prior consistent statement generally would need to
precede the prior inconsistent statement in order to logically refute the
impeachment so as to meet the relevancy requirement for admissibility.57 For
instance, a witness who testified at trial that a civil defendant sped through a red
traffic light and collided with the plaintiff's car might be impeached with her
deposition taken a year before trial in which she said that she was not sure of the
color of the light. The plaintiff then could prove the witness's statement to her
husband on the evening following the accident that the defendant had run a red
light.
Proposal, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 575, 591, 605-06 & nn.99-102 (1979) (noting that prior consistent
statements properly rebut such an attack "if the statement was made shortly after the event in
question").
5S This "premotive" set of facts was found to exist in, for example, United States v. Dominguez.
604 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding it was not error to permit a government agent to testify
to prior statements of prosecution witness, when witness's cross-examination was rife with
implications that he had improper motivation in testifying and that his testimony about two exhibits
was fabricated recently, and the "prior consistent statements were made long before he belatedly
produced the items in question"). It was found not to exist in, for example, United States v. Wei/.
561 F.2d 1109, 1111 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that because government failed to
establish that a witness's prior consistent statement was given prior to government's offer of
leniency, statement was admitted erroneously to rebut inference of improper motive resulting from
offer).
56 E.g., United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1274 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding it was not error to
admit prior consistent statement where facts indicated that consistent statement was "independent
of the alleged discrediting influence"); United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1134-35 (5th Cir.
1972) (per curiam); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104-05 (8th Cir. 1968). See State v.
George, 30 N.C. 324, 328 (1848) (per curiam) (In dictum, the court discussed settled North
Carolina law that provided that whether the statements were made before or after an alleged
improper influence "applies more properly to the weight than to the competency of the testimony.").
See also Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 525-27 (discussing pre-Tome split among the
circuits after the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted regarding whether post-motive statements
were admissible as substantive evidence or only for credibility purposes). See also infra note 109.
57 See Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836) (holding it was proper to have excluded a
prior consistent statement that was made after the impeaching prior inconsistent statement and was
not relevant to rebut impeachment); Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 518 & n.66 (citing
Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944); Gelbin v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 62
F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1933); American Agric. Chern. Co. v. Hogan, 213 F. 416, 420-21 (1st Cir.
1914); Baker v. People, 209 P. 791, 792-93 (Colo. 1922); Chicago City Ry. v. Matthieson, 72 N.E.
443, 444-45 (Ill. 1904); 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1126 (Chadbourn rev.
1972». Yet numerous courts disallowed even this use. See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at
518 & n.68. Professor Graham aptly describes the case law as "perplexing" and in "irreconcilable
conflict." Graham, supra note 54, at 576.
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Considerable case law gave the courts discretion t9 admit whatever prior
statements by the witness they found would be helpful to the jury in evaluating
the credibility of the witness's trial testimony, 58 as, for example, when the prior
statement helped to explain a prior inconsistent statement or to deny its having
been made. 59 Thus, a prior consistent statement close in time to, but nonetheless
made after a prior inconsistent statement could be admitted. In the example just
discussed, then, a statement given a week after the accident might be admitted,
despite proof that immediately after the accident the witness said, "I don't want
to get involved. I didn't see anything."
The common law immediately preceding the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence would have required that the court give a limiting instruction, on
request, that the prior consistent statement was to be considered only as to
credibility of the witness and not as substantive proof. 60 This limiting instruction
was required even though the statement admitted was by definition consistent
with, and thus cumulative of, the substantive testimony.

C. The Federal Rule
When the drafters of the federal rules considered the common law, they
seemed to recognize that, because prior consistent statements are by definition
consistent with the declarant's trial testimony, the requirement that a limiting
instruction be given was likely futile and apt to result, at best, in confusion of the
jury. Imagine a plaintiff's witness who has testified, "The traffic light was red
when the blue van drove through it." The defense impeaches the witness with
the fact that it has been three years since the accident, implying that she cannot
remember what happened. The plaintiff on redirect proves the witness's

S8 E.g., Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134 (per curiam); Hanger, 398 F.2d at 103-04; Copes v. United States,
345 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 519 & n.72 (citing, inter
alia, Nat'1 Postal Transp. Ass'n v. Hudson, 216 F.2d 193, 200 (8th Cir. 1954); Cafasso v.
PennsylvaniaR.R., 169 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1948); Affronti, 145 F.2d at 7 (8th Cir. 1944); State
v. Ouimette, 298 A.2d 124, 133-34 (R.I. 1972)). See also Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d
1266, 1271 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1971) (prior consistent statements were properly ~dmitted to correct the
prejudicial effect of the unfair cross-examination technique used by defendant's counsel, which
falsely suggested that there were inconsistencies).
S9 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 519 & no. 70-71 (citing Felice, 426 F.2d at 197-98 (2d
Cir. 1970); United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d 728, 733-35 (2d Cir. 1968); Newman v. United
States, 331 F.2d 968, 970-71 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Agueci; 310 F.2d 817, 834 (2d Cir.
1962); United States v. Lev, 276 F.2d 605,608 (2d Cir. 1960); Calasso, 169 F.2d at 453; Affronti,
145 F.2d at 7 ("[I]f some portions of a statement made by a witness are used on cross-examination
to impeach him, other portions of the statement which are relevant to the subject matter about
which he was cross-examined may be introduced in evidence to meet the force of the
impeachment."); United States v. Weinbren, 121 F.2d 826, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1941); Sweazey v.
Valley Transp., Inc., 107 P.2d 567, 572 (Wash. 1940)); Graham, supra note 54, at 594-602.
60 See Copes, 345 F.2d at 726-27 (finding that under the circumstances, the instruction was
adequate); Graham, supra note 54, at 578 (holding prior consistent statements admissible only as to
credibility). See also FED. R. EVID. 105 (limiting instruction process' generally, under the federal
evidence code).
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statement one week after the accident, that "the light was red for the blue van."
The judge informs the jury that it may not consider the latter statement as proof
the light was red for the blue van, but only on the issue as to whether the witness
was truthful when she testified at trial that the light was red for the blue van.
The jurors hearing such an instruction might reasonably be heard to snicker,
shake their heads, and murmur, like Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, "The law is a[n]
ass.,,61 If the jury believes the witness's trial testimony, the prior consistent
statement is merely cumulative. 62 There is no need for a limiting instruction if
the out-of-court statement duplicates already admitted substantive evidence. In
recognition of this fact, the drafters of the Federal Rules undertook to make such
prior consistent statements admissible as substantive evidence, thus obviating the
need for a limiting instruction. 63
Unfortunately, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is underinclusive in several ways. First, it
does not address all possible uses of prior consistent statements, but only those
that follow impeachment by "an express or implied charge against the declarant
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.,,64 The Rule requires not
only that there have been the type of impeachment suggesting "fabrication," but

CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TwIST 399 (Oxford University Press 1961) (1838) (comment by Mr.
Bumble when informed that the law presumes that the husband dominates the wife).
62 See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 176 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Thomas, JJ.) ("[E]ven in cases where the statement is admitted
as significantly probative (in respect to rehabilitation), the effect of admission on the trial will be
minimal because the prior consistent statements will (by their nature) do no more than repeat incourt testimony."); United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that ifit was
error to admit prior consistent statement, error was harmless, as evidence was "wholly
cumulative"); United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding error was
harmless because "[a]t most the evidence was an extra helping of what the jury had heard before");
United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 696 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding error was harmless because
it was cumulative); United States v. Lampkin, 159 F.3d 607, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding error
was harmless because the evidence was merely cumulative); United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469,
1482-84 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding the Tome rule is retroactive and under the facts of the case, it
was harmless error to admit post-motive consistent statements that "merely repeated" other
testimony); United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1450-51 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding it was harmless
error to admit statements that did not precede motive to fabricate); United States v. Simmons, 923
F.2d 934, 942-44 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding any error in admitting witness's grand jury
testimony was harmless); United States v. Mehra, 824 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding
admission of fully corroborated prior consistent statement, even if error, was harmless because it
added nothing of significance to government's case); Hamilton, 689 F.2d at 1274. But see United
States v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding it was reversible error to admit extrinsic
proof of prior consistent statements for rehabilitation and corroboration before their declarants had
testified or been impeached).
63 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(8) advisory committee's note ("The prior statement is consistent
with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its
admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally."). See
also infra note 108 and accompanying text.
64 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(8).
61
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also that it must suggest "recent fabrication.,,65 Further, the current paradigm for
analyzing that category of statements, as established by the Supreme Court's
majority of five in Tome, imposes a strict requirement that the prior consistent
statement have been made "before the impeaching fact" for admission under the
Rule. 66 Thus, current Rule 801(d)(I)(B) results in the exclusion as substantive
evidence of prior consistent statements that are post-motive, but that a jury would
find helpful in assessing the impeachment undertaken, suggesting fabrication.
Likewise, the current Rule excludes as substantive evidence prior consistent
statements when the witness has been impeached as having a dulled memory, and
the prior statements simply are from a time when the witness's memory was
fresher than it is at trial.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) states only:
Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut
charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as
substantive evidence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence. The
prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the
opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence, no
sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally. 67

Yet this rationale applies equally to relevant post-motive and fresher memory
statements that rebut the impeachment undertaken, but which Tome interpreted
the language of the Rule to exclude. No doubt for this reason, Professor
Friedman ventures that the Rule's underinclusiveness was unintentional:
[T]he most plausible explanation appears to be that this was just a careless bit
of drafting. The intention of the drafters seems to have been that if a prior
consistent statement is admissible for rehabilitation it should be admissible
substantively-that is, to prove the truth of what it asserts-notwithstanding
the rule against hearsay. The language used by the Rule describes the most
common, but not the exclusive, situation in which a prior consistent statement
might be admitted for "rehabilitation.,,68

In response to the underinclusiveness of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Chief Judge
Jack Weinstein of the United States District for the Eastern District of New
York,69 a leading evidence scholar, and many federaCo and state71 courts have

[d.
66513 U.S. 150 (1995). The Tome majority adopted the position advocated by Professor Ohlbaum
in his article. Ohlbaum, supra note 53. For an example of how the lower courts currently apply
Tome, see United States v. Bordeaux. 400 F.3d 548, 557 (8th Cir. 2005).
67 FED. R. EVID. 80 I (d)(l)(B) advisory committee's note.
68 Friedman, supra note 29, at 303-04.
69 E.g., United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329,335-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (endorsing liberal
admission of prior consistent statements when offered only for rehabilitation and not as substantive
proof, and urging that there is no need for requirement concerning time of statement).
70 E.g., United States v. Stover, 329 F.3d 859, 866-69 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1018
(2004); United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19,25-29 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Gluzman,
65
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154 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 919-920 (4th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1994) (proper rehabilitative use of prior
consistent statements); United States v. White, II F.3d 1446, 1449 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 587-89 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that although a prior consistent statement
not antedating motive to lie was not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(I)(B), it
was proper to admit statement to rehabilitate witness; prior consistent statements are more liberally
admitted for rehabilitation than as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(I)(B); prior inconsistent
statement can be put in "through specific testimony or through mischaracterization or suggestive or
misleading cross-examination. The question is not whether the defense introduces a specific
statement, but rather whether it has made a specific attack on a witness' credibility.") (citation
omitted); United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a prior
consistent statement made after prior inconsistent statement was admitted properly); United States
v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 784-87 (4th Cir.
1983) (finding that despite fact that authorities were split on question whether Rule 801(d)(I)(B)
conditions admissibility of prior consistent statements corroborative of an impeached witness's
testimony on the absence of a motive to fabricate at the time the prior statements were made, the
rule clearly includes no such limitation) (court distinguished between use of statements for purpose
of rehabilitation and as affirmative evidence); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 70 (2d Cir.
1979) (Friendly, J., concurring) (construing Fed. R. Evid. 102), ajJ'd on other grounds, 449 U.S.
424 (1981); Gonzalez v. DeTella, 918 F. Supp. 1214, 1222 (N.D. Ill. 1996). See United States v.
Lozada-Rivera, 177 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing split in authority regarding whether
restraints of Rule 801(d)(I)(B) apply to all prior consistent statements); Bullock & Gardner, supra
note 14, at 521-22 & nn.87-96 (citing cases); Friedman, supra note 29, at 319; Edward J.
lmwinkelreid, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REv. LITIG. 129, 152-53
(1987); Yvette Olstein, Pierre and Brennan: The Rehabilitation of Prior Consistent Statements, 53
BROOK. L. REv. 515 (1987). Cf United States v. Collicot, 92 F.3d 973, 979-82 (9th Cir. 1996)
(declining to reach question whether prior consistent statements that do not qualify under Rule
801(d)(I)(B) may be admitted as substantive evidence under the "opened door" doctrine);
Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1985) (in habeas corpus proceedings, district
court had held that, when defense impeached witness by showing that witness had made "deal,"
prosecution properly could show that part of deal was that witness had to pass a polygraph test (i. e.,
make a prior consistent statement); the appellate court affirmed on grounds that even if admission
of evidence was error, it was not of constitutional dimension). Contra United States v. Miller, 874
F.2d 1255, 1271-75 (9th Cir. 1989) (questioning whether a prior consistent statement is offered as
substantive evidence or to rehabilitate, remains whether the statement has probative value apart
from mere repetition; "we fail to see how a statement that has no probative value in rebutting a
charge of 'recent fabrication or improper influence or motive' could possibly have probative value
for the assertedly more 'limited' purpose of rehabilitating a witness") (citation omitted); United
States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 516-18 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding it is reversible error to admit postmotive consistent statements for purposes of corroboration). But see E. Desmond Hogan, Case
Note, A Consistent Interpretationfor 80J(d)(J)(B) Prior Consistent Statements, 39 How. L.J. 819,
839 (1996) ("[T]he [Tome] predate requirement applies when a prior statement is offered for
rehabilitation purposes.").
71 E.g., People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14,20-21 (Colo. 1999); Holmes v. State, 712 A.2d 554 (Md.
1998) (holding statement admissible when state's witness testified that she did not "give any
statement to police because Petitioner knew that she had witnessed the murder and she was
frightened for her safety. She also testified that Petitioner visited her the day after the murder
making her feel threatened." On cross-examination, defense counsel impeached her with her
written statement to police following the shooting, stating that she did not see who shot the victim.
On redirect, over objection, the court properly permitted the State to admit the witness's second
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fallen back to the common law approach to fill the gaps left by the Rule; they
admit helpful prior consistent statements for the limited purpose of use in
assessing the declarant's credibility. The four dissenting justices in Tome
endorsed the propriety of this approach,72 but the majority declined to address
ie3 There being no Confrontation Clause bar to substantive use of a testifying
witness's prior statements, as their reliability is subject to testing through crossexamination,74 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be amended to make this unnecessarily
complicated, two-tier approach obsolete, and permit substantive use of all such
statements that would both be helpful to the fact-finder and also pass Rule 403 75
scrutiny as not unduly prejudicial, distracting, or cumulative.
Such an
amendment also would further Rule 611 's goals allowing the trial court to "make
the interrogation [of witnesses] and presentation [of evidence] effective for the
ascertainment of the truth ... [and] avoid needless consumption oftime.,,76

IV.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF RULE 801(D)(1)(B)

Rule 80l(d)(1)(B) is underinclusiv:e. Its language and the result in Tome
cut the jury off from substantive use of a testifying witness's prior consistent
statements that would be helpful to it. The Tome rule usurps in part the jury's
fact-finding role as to whether the witness has a motive to lie and, if so, when it
arose and whether it affected the witness's trial testimony. An amended rule that
broadens the substantive admissibility of a witness's prior statements consistent
with her testimony, subject to exclusion in the court's discretion under Rule 403
as unduly prejudicial or cumulative, is desirable.

A. Shortcomings of the Present Rule: Underinclusiveness
Rule 80l(d)(1)(B) is underinclusive in two significant ways. First, it fails
altogether to address the use of prior consistent statements when the
impeachment undertaken (whether by proof of the witness's prior inconsistent

statement to the police, made two days after the shooting, identifying the defendant as the shooter)
(pursuant to explicit provision of Md. Rule 5-616(c)(2) regarding rehabilitation of witnesses, see
infra note 158); State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301 (N.J. 1997); State v. Brown, 969 P.2d 313, 325-26
(N.M. 1998); Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 145 (Wyo. 2000).
72 513 U.S. 150, 169-76 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, c.J., and O'Connor and
Thomas, n.).
73 Id. at 167 ("Our holding is confined to the requirements for admission under Rule
801(d)(1 )(8).").
74 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
75 FED. R. EVID. 403 (trial court may exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence"). See infra note 151.
76 FED. R. EVID. 611(a). "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (l) make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." Id.
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statement or otherwise, as by mere passage of time) is to suggest that the
witness's memory has faded. 77
Further, its treatment of the type of impeachment it does address-by
suggestion of fabrication by the witness-is also overly narrow for at least two
reasons. Most importantly, the Rule's strict requirement, as co~strued in Tome,
that in order to be substantively used the prior statement must precede an alleged
motive to fabricate, provides the defense with a facile way to slam the door
against statements that would be useful to the jury in determining what credence
to give to the impeachment, simply by alleging any preexisting motive to
fabricate. Tome's requirement works at all-and then only fairly well-when
there is an objective fact that concededly causes such a motive (regardless
whether it has affected the witness's testimony) and around which parameters of
time may easily be placed. In those cases, Tome applies, not unreasonably, to
permit only those consistent statements made before that objective event. 78
Such facts would include, for example, an employment relationship
between the witness and a party during which the witness might have a motive to
tailor her testimony to fit her employer's wishes. Another example would be the
firing of the employee, after which she might have the opposite motive. Other
objective facts concededly creating a !Dotive to lie might include friendship,
business partnership, or a romantic relationship. But drawing a bright line as to
when the relationship began may be difficult.

See United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 548 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding it is harmless error to
admit witness's prior notes under Rule 801(d)(I)(B), when cross-examination merely challenged
witness's memory); United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a prior
consistent statement is admissible both as substantive evidence to rebut motive to fabricate and as
rehabilitative evidence, with regard to impeachment by prior inconsistent statement); Baker v.
Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 559 (6th Cir. 1978) (arguably stretching to characterize crossexamination as to memory as an implication that witness made an earlier inconsistent statement,
and therefore implying that his trial testimony was "a recent fabrication or result of an improper
influence or motive," opening the door under Rule 801(d)(l)(B)).
78 E.g., United States v. Wilson, 355 F.3d 358, 361-62 (5th Cir. 2003) (in this drug distribution case
when a government witness testified pursuant to a plea bargain to having worked for the defendant
in the distribution of drugs and cross-examination implied that plea bargain benefits gave witness
motive to fabricate his testimony, the trial judge properly permitted the government to introduce a
letter, which referred to similar facts, written by the witness three years before the plea bargain; the
Court of Appeals explained, "A prior consistent statement need not rebut all motives to fabricate,
but only the specific motive alleged at trial."); United States v. Stoecker, 215 F.3d 788, 791 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that statements made several years before plea agreement were properly
admitted); United States v. Allison, 49 M.J. 54 (C.M.A. 1998) (holding no abuse of discretion in
admitting videotape of an early interview of child abuse victim by a social worker, which rebutted
at least some of the alleged motives to fabricate, including coaching by various persons after the
interview occurred); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 263-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding
that statement made before a plea bargain rebutted impeachment of motive to lie because of the
plea bargain); Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d 875, 894 n.ll (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that
child's statement prior.to tell!ng her mother of alleged sexual abuse rebutted impeachment that
child had a motive to lie because of mother's prodding).
77

18

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1

In a criminal case, such a motive objectively occurs when one person is
either arrested or "caught with the goods" and that person implicates another,
"bigger fish" in the crime. 79 For example, in celebrity Martha Stewart's trial, her
defense lawyers suggested on cross-examination of prosecution witness Douglas
Faneuil that his testimony (which inculpated himself, his boss Peter Bacanovic,
and Stewart) was given in an attempt to curry favor with the government. The
trial judge ruled that the prosecution then could offer testimony as to Fanueil's
prior consistent conversations with his friends, before any effort to plea bargain
with the government. 80
But reasonable minds may differ as to when an alleged motive to fabricate
will have arisen. 81 A number of courts have found, for example, that post-arrest
statements made to authorities before any discussion of plea bargaining were not
made after an alleged motive to win favor with the prosecution. 82 Thus, the
Tome model does not ensure predictability or uniformity of result, and ultimately
fails to further justice.
When the existence of the improper motive, or of a fact that would create
such a motive, is hotly disputed, Tome allows the mere self-serving allegation of
fabrication to preclude answering that allegation by the substantive use of any of

E.g., United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 609-11 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding it was harmless
error to admit coconspirators' prior consistent statements, made during post-arrest interviews,
which implicated the defendant as one of their employers in a drug business); United States v.
Zapata, 356 F. Supp.2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also United States v. Esparza, 291 F.3d 1052
(8th Cir. 2002) (holding defendant's exculpatory statement made to highway patrol upon discovery
of drugs was properly excluded because motive to lie existed).
80 Stewart Judge to Allow Evidence Backing Prosecution Witness, BALT. SUN, Feb. 18,2004, at 10.
For a similar fact scenario, see Andrea F. Siegel, Jury Hears Account of Fatal Brawl, BALT. SUN,
May 11,2005, at lB. After a witness for the prosecution had been impeached with the suggestion
that he fabricated his story from the police report and that his account "surfaced only as prosecutors
were weighing which off the six defendants [including the witness] to try first," the court permitted
the witness's uncle to testify that the witness had told him the same account "from the start."
81 United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1992). See infra notes 135-36.
82 See United States v. Prieto, 232 F .3d 816, 819-22 (11 th Cir. 2000) (holding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that declarant had no motive to fabricate on the evening of his
arrest, when the subject of declarant's cooperation had not been raised); United States v. Mincey,
106 Fed. App'x 750 (2d Cir. 2004) (mem.) (holding it was not error to have admitted a government
witness's prior consistent statement made "when she was initially questioned by government
agents," as defendant failed to establish that witness had a motive to falsely implicate him at that
time); United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1I00 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Wald, J., concurring);
United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1987) (fmding that witness's arrest did not
create a motive to falsely implicate defendant when witness did not mention defendant upon
witness's arrest, but four weeks later when entering a cooperation agreement, and defendant was
not arrested until three months after that); United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1983)
(holding post-arrest pre-plea bargain statements admissible). See also Arizona v. Johnson, 351
F.3d 988, 998-1000 (9th Cir. 2003) cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 254 (2004) (holding no abuse of
discretion in fmding that an illegal immigrant's statement to a Border Patrol Agent about abuse by
another agent was made before any motive to fabricate). See infra note 135.
79
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the declarant's prior consistent statements. In this regard, the Tome model fails.
As in Tome itself, an insuperable catch-22 is created.
In Tome the alleged motive to lie was the child's desire to live with her
mother. 83 This motive-the existence of which was not conceded-would have
existed as soon as she was sent to live with her father. Yet, as it was alleged that
when she went to live with her father was when the abuse began,84 there was no
way that any of her prior consistent statements regarding abuse could have
preceded the alleged motive to lie. Thus, under Tome, the mere allegation of the
motive to lie foreclosed the admissibility under Rule 801(d)(I)(B) of evidence
that the jury reasonably could have found find crucial in evaluating the existence
and impact of the alleged motive. This undesirable result occurs even when the
motive is not conceded to exist. 8S In an illogical, circular mode of reasoning, the
mere allegation of the motive becomes a self-fulfilling end run against the
witness, who is left defenseless against the accusation, except for her own
protestations from the stand.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has found
similarly circular the defense's argument that an informant's prior consistent
statements, made after his arrest but before he had entered into a plea agreement,
were inadmissible as being post-motive. 86 Judge Erwin, writing for the panel,
concluded that such an argument "effectively swallows the rule with respect to
prior consistent statements made to government officers: by definition such
statements would never be prior to the event of apprehension or investigation by
the government which gave rise to a motive to falsity.,,87
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is also underinclusive, even as to the one mode of
impeachment it addresses, in its superfluous, explicit requirement that in order to
open the door to substantive use of prior consistent statements, the impeachment
undertaken must be an implied or express charge not simply of "fabrication or

Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 153, 165 (1995).
While discovery of sexual abuse by a spouse may lead to marital separation, abuse by the father
often begins after the parents have separated for other reasons. See Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REv.
251, 253-56 (2001). See generally Thea Brown, Separated and Unmarried Fathers and the
Courts: Fathers and Child Abuse Allegations in the Context of Parental Separation and Divorce,
41 FAM. CT. REv. 367 (2003) (commenting that while sexual abuse is most commonly committed
by a male, fathers are not the most common offenders).
85 See Christopher A. Jones, Casenote, Clinging to History: The Supreme Court (Mis)Interprets
Federal Rule of Evidence 80J(d)(J)(B) as Containing a Temporal Requirement, 29 U. RICH. L.
REv. 459, 491 (1995). "[Under Tome,] allegations of fabrication that trigger the temporal
requirement never have to be substantiated. Due to the lack of a substantiation requirement, the
possibility of abuse is high." Id. Moreover, with a very young declarant, the option of admitting a
prior statement as recorded recollection under Rule 803(5) is unlikely. Either the child declarant
will not have recorded anything or, even if the person to whom the child spoke recorded her
statement, a very young child is unlikely to be able to testify to the required foundational elements.
Id. See also infra note 123.
86 Henderson, 717 F.2d at 137.
87 I d. at 139.
83
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improper influence or motive" but of "recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive."ss Why the adjective "recent" was emjloyed and what effect its
inclusion has are not easy questions to answer.s A good part of the oral
argument time in Tome was spent in attempts to resolve these matters. 90 Perhaps
the term was included simply as a result of the Rule's parroting, without careful
analysis, the language of precedents such as Ellicott v. Pearl, in which Justice
Story stated that "proof of an antecedent declaration ... may be admitted" when
"a fabrication of a recent date" is alleged. 91
.
Whether "fabrication" needed to be modified in the Rule at all is
questionable. Since fabrication is undesirable in a witness, no matter when it
occurs or what for what motive, the added restriction to fabrication from an

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(B) (emphasis added). Maryland's corollary rule, for example, deletes
the word "recent." MD. RULE 5-802.1 (b).
89 See, e.g., People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. 1949) ("[W]e think that 'recent' as so used
[in the pre-Rules case law], has a relative, not an absolute meaning. It means, we think, that the
defense is charging the witness not with mistake or confusion, but with making up a false story well
after the event. 'Recently fabricated' means the same thing as fabricated to meet the exigencies of
the case.") (citations omitted); Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. ISO (1995) (No. 93-6892)
("By its express terms, [Rule 801(d)(I)(B)] is limited to prior consistent statements that rebut the
suggestion that the witness's trial testimony reflects a change in position.").
88

Let us put aside the argument made by the Government in Tome that "recent" is
meant only to modify 'fabrication.' Though the argument is not utterly implausible,
neither is it persuasive, and Justice Breyer's formulation-that the statement must
show "that the witness did not recently fabricate his testimony as a result of an
improper influence or motive"-seems useful. Even on this reading, however,
"recent" is notoriously ambiguous. If taken literally, it seems to address the temporal
relation of the fabrication, influence, or motive to the trial, not to the statement.
Moreover, it seems clear that the word cannot be taken literally, in the dictionary
sense of "occurring at a time immediately before the present." Thus "recent" should
be given a construction that fits the rehabilitation idea underlying the Rule. In my
view, "arising recently enough that the prior statement retains substantial rebuttal
value" satisfies this standard and does not distort the language. In most cases-but
not in all-this construction would be equivalent to "arising after the statement was
made."
Friedman, supra note 29, at 314-15 (footnotes omitted); Graham, supra note 54, at 582-83, 614
("recent" is "superfluous," and means only "any time after the event").
90 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Tome, 513 U.S. 150, available at 1994 WL 665263.
91 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 156 ("As Justice Story explained: '[w]here the testimony is assailed as a
fabrication of a recent date, . . . in order to repel such imputation, proof of the antecedent
declaration of the party may be admitted.'" (quoting Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439, 9
L.Ed. 475 (1836»). See also id. at 159-60 (citing Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104 (8th
Cir. 1968»; Ohlbaum, supra note 53, at 245 ("Rule 801(d)(l)(B) employs the precise language'[rebutting charges] of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive'-consistently used in the
panoply of pre-l 975 decisions."».
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"improper influence or an improper motive" is redundant92-and, if somehow not
redundant, it is unnecessarily narrowing. As to the recency requirement, perhaps
it was mistakenly thought that were the alleged fabrication not recent, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to find a consistent statement that logically rebutted
the fabrication. But, when closely evaluated, the cases do not support such a
restriction. As Judge Bullock noted, "An attack on a witness's memory often,
but not always, includes a charge of recent fabrication.,,93
Indeed, the Rule's recency requirement seems. to have been read as
superfluous. 94 If, for example, the Tome Court had found the recency
requirement to be significant, it could have rested its decision of inadmissibility
under 80l(d)(1)(B) on the ground that the child's alleged fabrication was not
"recent." The Court did not do so. It also could have chosen to read the
disjunctive use of "or improper influence or motive" as providing an additional
way of opening the door under Rule 80 1(d)(1)(B), other than "recent
fabrication-an additional way that would not be modified by "recent."
Instead, despite the fact that the Tome majority's opinion,95 the
concurrence,96 and the dissent,97 repeatedly quote or refer to the modifier
"recent," all three opinions seem to read both "recent" and the first "or" out of
the Rule,98 so that the Rule in substance connotes merely "fabrication stemming
from either an improper influence or an improper motive."

See Graham, supra note 54, at 585 ('''influence' is superfluous, and an 'improper' motive is any
motive that tends to induce the witness to do anything but tell the truth").
93 Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 515 n.46.
92

Although an attack on a witness's memory may include a charge of purposeful
deception, such an attack does not always do so. For example, an attack charging
inaccurate memory by showing the witness's simple Jorgetfulness or confusion may
be made without charging purposeful deception. Common-law courts, however, often
seemed to treat "recent fabrication" as a term of art, including non-purposeful
deception within its definition. Other courts, in admitting prior consistent statements
to rebut attacks on a witness's memory, recognized some distinction between such
attacks and a charge of recent fabrication. These courts reasoned that such attacks
created situations that were 'sufficiently analogous' to the cases admitting prior
consistent statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication.
See id. at 517 & nn.58-59 (footnotes omitted).
94 See supra note 89.
95 E.g., 513 U.S. at 156, 159 ("recent fabrication or improper influence or motive").
96Id. at 168 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("recent fabrication or improper motive, but not ... that the

witness' memory is playing tricks").
/d. at 169 (Breyer, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Thomas, JJ.) ("recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive").
98 E.g., id. at 158, 159 ("fabrication or improper influence or motive"); id. at 162-63 (the existence
of "an improper influence or motive"). The majority in Tome first speaks of the two elementsfabrication and improper influence or motive--as synonymous, a "requirement that the consistent
statements must have been made before the alleged influence, or motive to fabricate, arose." Id. at
158. The majority then retreats again to the disjunctive format. Id. ("Impeachment by charging
97
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B. The Unsatisfactory Stopgap of Limited Admissibility
The lower courts have responded to Rule 801(d)(I)(B)'s shortcomings by
falling back to the common law approach with regard to relevant, helpful
statements that do not fall within Tome's parameters, and admitting them with a
limiting instruction. 99 This stopgap approach is unsatisfactory and inadequate for
two reasons. First, limiting instructions are confusing and likely ineffective. 100
Second, this approach requires the exclusion of such prior consistent statements
if the court finds that the jury will be unduly tempted to use them as substantive
evidence.
This result is particularly problematic in cases where a key witness is
vulnerable in the courtroom and easil~ confused on cross-examination because,
for example, of either extreme youth 1 1 or advanced age. Under current law, if
the declarant's accuracy is crucial to the case and the declarant's in-court manner
is weak, the jury cannot use her prior consistent statements as substantive

that the testimony is a recent fabrication or results from an improper influence or motive is, as a
general matter, capable of direct and forceful refutation through introduction of out-of-court
consistent statements that predate the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive." (emphasis added)).
This juxtaposition suggests that the majority is using "or" to link terms it is using as synonyms.
The majority also quotes Deans Wigmore and McCormick, both of whom refer only to charges of
"bias" and such. Id. at 156 ("McCormick and Wigmore stated the rule in a more categorical
manner. '[l1he applicable principle is that the prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute
the charge unless the consistent statement was made before the source of the bias, interest,
influence or incapacity originated. '" (citing E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 49, p. 105 (2d ed.
1972); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1128 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1972) ("'A consistent statement, at a
time prior to the existence of a fact said to indicate bias ... will effectively explain away the force
of the impeaching evidence .... "') (emphasis omitted))). The dissent, too, refers to a witness who
"recently fabricate[s] his testimony as a result of an improper influence or motive." Tome, 513
U.S. at 170 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Thomas, II.).
99 See supra notes 69-71.
100 E.g., United States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802 (2d Cir. 1994). See supra text accompanying notes
60-63; see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., Lawson v. State, 865 A.2d 617, 631 (Md. App. 2005), cer!. granted, 2005 Md. LEXIS
271 (Md., May 12, 2005).
"[A] young child can be easily intimidated into not testifying about [such] offenses ..
.. " State v. Benwire, 98 S.W.3d 618,624 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). For that reason and
others, "as a general phenomenon, child abuse victims frequently recant their initial
reports of abuse." Yount v. State, 99 Md. App. 207, 210, 636 A.2d 50 (1994).
Indeed, it has been observed that a child's out-of-court statements may "be more
reliable than the child's testimony at trial, which may suffer distortion by the trauma
of the courtroom setting or become contaminated by contacts and influences prior to
trial." Benwire, 98 S.W.3d at 624 (citation and emphasis omitted). That is why, we
hold, that any conflicts between Nigha's out-of-court statements and her in-court
testimony do not render her out-of-court statements inadmissible, but rather present a
question of credibility to be resolved by the jury.
Id.
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evidence. Under Tome, this holds true when the opponent's allegation that the
witness has a motive to lie is either not based on a fact that the witness concedes
to be true or cannot be traced to a determinable time before which a relevant
prior statement could possibly have been made. 102 Current Rule 801(d)(I)(B), as
construed in Tome, excludes the substantive use of statements that the jury might
find-and many lower courts have found-helpful to assess what effect, if any,
to give the impeachment.
Where a jury might find that a witness's prior consistent statements add
probative value beyond the witness's in-court testimony, the courts currently are
constrained to exclude them, for fear that the jury might not follow an instruction
limiting their use to evaluating the credibility of the witness's trial testimony.lo3
This unnecessarily complicated approach should be jettisoned in favor of making
such relevant statements admissible under Rule 801(d)(I)(B).
This is not to suggest that any impeachment would open the door to prior
consistent statements. Such statements are not relevant to rebut impeachment by
evidence of bad character; the fact that someone who would not hesitate to lie.
said the same thing before that he claims in court proves nothing with regard to
the probative value that should be given to his in-court testimony. 104 A witness's
prior consistent statements may be relevant not only when the method of
impeachment is fabrication (as currently addressed by Rule 801(d)(1)(B)~6 but
also when the method of impeachment is prior inconsistent statement 5 or

See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6.
104 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158.

102
103

A consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that
the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive. By contrast, prior
consistent statements carry little rebuttal force when most other types of impeachment
are involved. McCormick § 49, p. 105 ("When the attack takes the form of
impeachment of character, by showing misconduct, convictions or bad reputation, it is
generally agreed that there is no color for sustaining by consistent statements. The
defense does not meet the assault" (footnote omitted»; see also 4 Wigmore § 1131, p.
293 ("The broad rule obtains in a few courts that consistent statements may be
admitted after impeachment of any sort-in particular after any impeachment by crossexamination. But there is no reason for such a loose rule." (footnote omitted».
Id.
105 Compare, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an
officer's prior consistent statements to his partner, prior to his post-incident report which omitted
certain details was admitted properly) with United States v. Toney, 161 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the trial court properly excluded a coconspirator's statements that were made six
months after her arrest, when the coconspirator and ringleader had pled guilty and testified that she
had duped the defendant who had no knowledge of alleged fraud; the government impeached
coconspirator with her inconsistent statement made upon her arrest, and argued that coconspirator's
"motive to lie" to exculpate her friend, the defendant, arose after the scheme began to unravel and
government charged defendant).
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memory loss. As Justice Breyer, writing for the four dissenting justices in Tome,
explained,
The majority is correct in saying that there are different kinds of categories of
prior consistent statements that can rehabilitate a witness in different ways,
includinffi statements (a) placing a claimed inconsistent statement in
context; 6 (b) showing that an inconsistent statement was not made; (c)
indicating that the witness' memory is not as faulty as a cross-examiner has
claimed; and (d) showing that the witness did not recently fabricate his
testimony as a result of an improper influence or motive .... But, I do not see
where, in the existence of several categories, the majority can find the
premise, which it seems to think is important, that the reason the drafters
singled out one category (category (d)) was that category's special probative
force in respect to rehabilitating a witness .... I doubt the premise because,
as McCormick points out, other categories of prior consistent statements
(used for rehabilitation) also, on occasion, seem likely to have strong
probative force. What, for example, about such statements introduced to
rebut a charge of faulty memory (category (c) above)? McCormick says
about such statements: "If the witness's accuracy of memory is challenged, it
seems clear common sense that a consistent statement made shortly after the
event and before he had time to forget, should be received in support."
Would not such statements (received in evidence to rehabilitate) often turn
out to be highly probative as well?I07

The dissent argued that the real reason for Rule 80l(d)(1)(B) was a practical
one: the inefficacy of limiting instructions:
Juries have trouble distinguishing between the rehabilitative and substantive
use of the kind of prior consistent statements listed in Rule SOI(d)(I)(B).
Judges may give instructions limiting the use of such prior consistent
statements to a rehabilitative purpose, but, in practice, juries nonetheless tend
to consider them for their substantive value. See 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence ~ SOI(d)(l)(B)[OI], p. SOl-ISS (1994) ("As a practical
matter, the jury in all probability would misunderstand or ignore a limiting
instruction [with respect to the class of prior consistent statements covered by
the Rule] anyway, so there is no good reason for giving one"). It is possible
that the Advisory Committee made them "nonhearsay" for that reason, i.e., as
a concession "more of experience than of logic." Advisory Committee's
Notes on Fed.Rule Evid. 801(d)(l)(B), 28 U.S.C. App., p. 773 .... On this

106 See, e.g., United States v. Denton, 246 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Simonelli,
237 F.3d 19, 25-29 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding prior consistent statements placing other prior
inconsistent statements in context were admitted properly; admission of others that went beyond
that purpose was harmless error); Engbretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721, 730 (6th Cir.
1994) (holding that prior consistent statements inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(I)(B) may be
admissible for a limited purpose if they rehabilitate the witness "by clarifying or explaining his
prior statements").
107
513 U.S. at 170 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Thomas,
JJ.) (citation omitted).
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rationale, however, there is no basis for distinguishing between premotive
and postmotive statements, for the confusion with respect to each would very
likely be the same. 108

The dissenters would have applied the crucible of logical relevance, rather
than a rigid pre-or-post-motive standard with regard to admissibility under the
Rule, as some .post-motive statements will be relevant to rebut the attempted
impeachment. 10

108 Id. at 171. See, e.g., United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19,27 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[T]he line
between substantive use of prior statements and their use to buttress credibility on rehabilitation is
one which lawyers and judges draw but which may well be meaningless to jurors."); SALTZBURG,
supra note 14, § 801-02[4][c] at 801-38 ("A line between substantive and rehabilitative use of these
statements may well be of little use. Yet this is the line drawn by the Rule ...."). See also infra
notes 113, 132-33.
109 Tome, 513 U.S. at 172-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and
Thomas, JJ.)

A postmotive statement is relevant to rebut, for example, a charge of recent
fabrication based on improper motive, say, when the speaker made the prior statement
while affected by a far more powerful motive to tell the truth. A speaker might be
moved to lie to help an acquaintance. But, suppose the circumstances also make clear
to the speaker that only the truth will save his child's life. Or, suppose the postmotive
statement was made spontaneously, or when the speaker's motive to lie was much
weaker than it was at trial. In these and similar situations, special circumstances may
indicate that the prior statement was made for some reason other than the alleged
improper motivation; it may have been made not because of, but despite, the improper
motivation. Hence, postmotive statements can, in appropriate circumstances, directly
refute the charge of fabrication based on improper motive, not because they bolster in
a general way the witness' trial testimony, ... but because the circumstances indicate
that the statements are not causally connected to the alleged motive to lie. For another
thing, the common-law premotive rule was not as uniform as the majority suggests. A
minority of courts recognized that postmotive statements could be relevant to rebut a
charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive under the right
circumstances.
Id. (citations omitted). Judge Bullock elaborates, exploring situations where post-motive
statements have "rebuttal force or related value," including: (1) "when a separate motive to tell the
truth or to make a different statement exists at the statement's making;" (2) "when the charged
motive is contextually weak. For example, consider a situation where a criminal defendant alleges
that a large number of police officers are conspiring to frame the defendant. The defendant
impliedly charges that the officers are lying on the stand about their investigation, and charges that
the improper motivation arose as soon as each officer arrived on the crime scene. Should such a
charge prevent the officers from being rehabilitated by showing that they made prior consistent
statements from the beginning of their investigation? Would not their consistency tend to show the
absence of such a conspiracy even. though the prior consistent statements were made after the
alleged conspiracy began?;" (3) the spontaneity of particular statements may refute the impact of a
charged motive; (4) "A declarant's ability to tell a complicated or unique story more than once
may, in some instances, indicate reliability and be relevant. Child sex-abuse cases are one example
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Indeed the Tome majority conceded, "[T]here may arise instances when
out-of-court statements that postdate the alleged fabrication have some probative
force in rebutting a charge of fabrication or improper influence or motive .... ,,110
The majority saw no constitutional impediment to broadening the Rule in the
way proposed in this article, as Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority
reasoned:
If consistent statements are admissible without reference to the time frame we
find imbedded in the Rule, there appears no sound reason not to admit
consistent statements to rebut other forms of impeachment as well . . . .
Congress could have adopted [the] rule [sought by the Government in Tome]
with ease, providing, for instance, that 'a witness' prior consistent statements
are admissible whenever relevant to assess the witness' truthfulness or
accuracy. I I I

The majority concluded that it was hamstrung by the language of the
current Rule. Tome in no way precludes amendment of the Rule so as to overrule
the result reached in that case and follow instead the path urged by the dissent.
When the Advisory Committee made its choice for Rule 801 (d)(1), it
acknowledged (as pointed out by Justice Breyer in dissent in Tome) that it was a
''judgment ... more of experience than of logic.,,112 The experience referred to
apparently was the inutility of the limiting instruction. Experience tells us that
that inutility extends to all of a witness's prior consistent statements 1l3 so there is
of this situation. A young child's postmotive description of the details of sexual abuse can offer
some value and indicate that the child is not fabricating the story. A jury is able to weigh these
possibilities in context and should be allowed to do so;" and (5) "When a witness testifies as to his
or her own prior consistent statement, the jury's ability to view the witness testifying offers more
than the statement itself. It gives the jurors another opportunity to observe the witness and judge
the witness's credibility." Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 535-37. See supra note 56. See
also Lesley E. Daigle, Note, Tell Me No Timing Rule and I'll Tell You No Lies: Why a Child's
Prior Consistent Statements Should Be Admissible Without a Pre-Motive Requirement-A Critique
of Tome v. United States, 17 REv. LITIG. 91, 95,104-10 (Winter 1988) (reviewing social science
literature and concluding that "repeated consistent statements of young children have a particular
reliability, independent of whether they were made pre- or post-motive"); Friedman, supra note 29,
at 310-13 (explaining post-motive statements may rebut the charge of improper influence if the
influence may well have had less impact at the time of the prior statement than it would have at
trial; the earlier influence could be lesser, for example, (1) because "a grudge, or other improper
influence, ... builds over time;" or (2) because of "the circumstances or manner in which the
witness made the statement," such as in a conversation with an intimate). See also supra note 56.
110 5 13 U.S. at 158.
111/d. at 159.
112 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee's note. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
113 Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 540-41.
Distinctions between the substantive and non substantive use of prior consistent
statements are normally distinctions without practical meaning. Juries have a very
difficult time understanding an instruction about the difference between substantive
and nonsubstantive use. This is likely a large part of the reason that the drafters of
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no reason to preclude the substantive use of such statements when they would be
sufficiently helpful to the trier of fact. Rule 801 (d)(1 )(B) should be amended to
permit the substantive use of a witness's prior consistent statements that the trial
court finds, as a preliminary matter under Rule 104(a), can logically be seen to
rebut the impeachment undertaken. If that requirement is met, the court
nonetheless in its discretion may exclude the evidence pursuant to Rule 403, and
should apply that Rule to exclude evidence that is only marginally relevant or
that is unduly repetitious.
This approach may be criticized on the ground that it provides for judicial
discretion, under Rules 80 1(d)(1)(B), 403, and 611, which decreases
predictability. 114 Yet the current standard itself creates unpredictability,1I5 as
Rule 801(d)(l)(B) provided that evidence that meets the Rule's requirements is
admissible substantively. It makes little sense to differentiate prior consistent
statements with a cumbersome time-line rule in regard to the statements' admission as
substantive evidence while also allowing the admission of statements rejected by such
a rule when juries normally do not make such differentiations. Experience shows that
jurors are adept at determining the weight to be given to a witness's testimony and can
easily recognize the interest a witness has in the matter about which he or she
testified, including any motive that could affect the witness's credibility. In
recognition of this, the Federal Rules should explicitly provide that all prior consistent
statements, when admissible to rehabilitate, are admissible as substantive evidence.
The weight given these statements would then be for the jury to determine.
[d. See supra notes 62-63, 100, 108 and accompanying text.
114 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 165.
The statement-by-statement balancing approach advocated by the Government and
adopted by the Tenth Circuit creates the precise dangers the Advisory Committee
noted and sought to avoid: It involves considerable judicial discretion; it reduces
predictability; and it enhances the difficulties of trial preparation because parties will
have difficulty knowing in advance whether or not particular out-of-court statements
will be admitted.
[d.
115 See id. at 165-66 (conceding, "We are aware that in some cases it may be difficult to ascertain
when a particular fabrication, influence, or motive arose."); Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at
537.

rnhis potential uncertainty does not outweigh the need to allow the jury to consider
relevant matters. Moreover, rejecting the time-line rule would leave no more
uncertainty than is present with the current rule. The parties cannot know exactly how
the court will rule in regard to relevancy or the premotive or postmotive status of a
prior consistent statement. This is particularly evident in the many co-defendantturned-state's-evidence cases. Whether the trial court will fmd that the co-defendant's
motive arose when he or she was first approached by the government, after a deal was
put on paper, or at some other time, seems nearly impossible to predict ahead of the
ruling. Similarly, witnesses' uncertainty of dates and wavering testimony will often
leave pre-trial predictions on the admissibility of a prior consistent statement difficult.
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reasonable minds can differ as to the date when a motive to fabricate arose. The
proposed standard merely adds the flexibility necessary for assessment of
helpfulness,116 a test that the courts already routinely apply in the lay and expert
opinion arenas.1I7 The trial judge should be able to admit, without a limiting
[d. (footnote omitted); Friedman, supra note 29, at 316-18. See also supra notes 81-82.
116 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 511 ("A more flexible approach, one that takes
account of the realities ofajury trial, is needed."); id. at 539.
The parties, and the jury, would be better served if the court could consider the
admissibility of a proffered prior consistent statement in relation to all of the
circumstances of the particular case. When considering the admissibility of prior
consistent statements, courts' attention should be directed toward the charged motive,
its context, and all of its characteristics, not merely the motive's alleged birthday.
When the characteristics and context of a prior consistent statement, including a
postmotive prior consistent statement, indicate that the statement is relevant to the
juries' consideration of a witness's credibility, or to other relevant issues, the
statement should be admissible.

[d. See infra note 151.
117 See supra notes 17-18. As the dissenting opinion in Tome explains:
[T]here is no indication in any of the cases that trial judges would, or· do, find it
particularly difficult to administer a more flexible rule in this [Rule 801(d)(I)(B)]
context. And, there is something to be said for the greater authority that flexibility
grants the trial judge to tie rulings on the admissibility of rehabilitative evidence more
closely to the needs and circumstances of the particular case. 1 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~ 401[01], pp. 401-8 to 401-9 (1994) ("A flexible
approach ... is more apt to yield a sensible result than the application of a mechanical
rule") ... .
This Court has acknowledged that the Federal Rules of Evidence worked a change in
common-law relevancy rules in the direction of flexibility. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).
. . . The Rules direct the trial judge generally to admit all evidence having "any
tendency" to make the existence of a material fact "more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." Fed. Rules Evid. 401, 402. The judge may
reject the evidence (assuming compliance with other rules) only if the probative value
of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its tendency to prejudice a party or
delay a trial. Rule 403. The codification, as a general matter, relies upon the trial
judge's administration of Rules 401, 402, and 403 to keep the barely relevant, the time
wasting, and the prejudicial from the jury. See, e.g., Abel, supra at 54, 105 S.Ct., at
470 ("A district court is accorded a wide discretion in ... assessing the probative
value of [proffered evidence], and weighing any factors counseling against
admissibility"); 1 Weinstein's Evidence, supra ~ 401[01] (discussing broad discretion
accorded trial judge); 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure §
5162 (1978 and 1994 Supp.) ....

Daubert suggests that the liberalized relevancy provisions of the Federal Rules can
supersede a pre-existing rule of relevance, at least where no compelling practical or
logical support can be found for the pre-existing rule. It is difficult to find any strong

2005] POST-CRA WFORD: PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

29

. instruction, a witness's prior consistent statements that the jury would reasonably
find to be helpful and that are not unduly cumulative. If post-motive statements
are occasionally admitted under this test, the opponent may impeach them by
arguing that the witness's motive to lie already existed at the time of the
statement.

C. The Current Rule Creates an Insurmountable Barrier for Alleged Child
Abuse Victims

Tome has had a "devastating effect" on sexual child abuse prosecutions.1I8
Child abuse defendants often argue that the child fabricated the allegations of
abuse or that the child was coached to fabricate them. 119 Where the defendant
had a parental or quasi-parental relationship with the child, such as in Tome
itself, defendants also often allege that the child was angry because the defendant
was a disciplinarian,120 or because the child wanted to live somewhere other than
with the defendant for some other reason. 12I Such a motive would naturally run
throughout the entire time that the child knew or lived with the defendant. By
requiring that, in order to be admissible under 801(b)(1)(B), the child's prior
consistent statements must precede the alleged improper motive, Tome creates an
insurmountable catch-22. 12 The child would have had no ability to report abuse
by the defendant before she knew the defendant or lived with the defendant, as
practical or logical considerations for making the premotive rule an absolute condition
of admissibility here. Perhaps there are other circumstances in which categorical
common-law rules serve the purposes of Rules 401, 402, and 403, and should,
accordingly, remain absolute in the law. But... this case, like Daubert, does not
present such a circumstance.
513 U.S. at 173-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.]., and O'Connor and Thomas,
JJ.).
liS See Brief for the States of Ohio, et aI., as Amici Curiae iIi Support of Respondent, Tome v.
United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) (No. 93-6892).
[T]he amici States would stress that the "pre-motive" restriction which Petitioner
seeks to read into Rule 801(d)(I)(B) could have a devastating effect on efforts to
prosecute charges of sexually abusing a child. As this Court recognized in Craig, the
serious difficulties of obtaining testimony from victims of child abuse, and of sexual
abuse in particular, in the traumatic setting of a courtroom trial should not be
minimized. Especially in the case of young children, spontaneous or otherwise
reliable statements made outside the courtroom often can provide useful and quite
probative evidence as to the actual facts of the case.

Id.
See, e.g., Tome, 513 U.S. at 153, 165.
See, e.g., Churchfield v. State, 769 A.2d 313 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (defendant made such
an allegation).
121 See, e.g., Tome, 513 U.S. at 153, 165.
122 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
119
120
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the case may be. Moreover, as in Tome the defendant may easily charge such a
motive, but need not prove convincingly that it existed, in order to foreclose the
admissibility of "pre-motive" statements. 123 Until Tome is overruled by an
amendment to Rule 801(d)(I)(B), the jury will be deprived of the ability to use
those statements that it might reasonably find helpful as substantive evidence.
Imagine being seated on a jury in a case where the prosecution alleges that a
small child was physically or sexually abused by his custodial parent. Assume
that there is physical evidence of abuse. Assume further that in fact the child was
abused and that he eventually confides in his non-custodial parent, and in a
pediatrician to whom that parent takes him. The pediatrician reports the abuse to
the prosecutor who charges the custodial parent. At trial, approximately a year
and a half after the alleged abuse, the child is tongue-tied. The prosecutor is
permitted to ask leading questions, to which the child accedes with apparent
hesitation.
On cross-examination, the defense lawyer intimates that the allegations are
false and that the child fabricated them--either on his own or at the non-custodial
parent's urging-so as to be with the non-custodial parent, who does not
discipline the child.
Would it be helpful to you as a juror to hear the non-custodial parent, the
pediatrician, or both, testify to the child's earlier statements, which are consistent
with the child's halting testimony at trial? Would the direct and crossexamination of these witnesses be helpful to you in evaluating what weight to
give the respective allegations of abuse and of fabrication? If the testimony of
either or both of these witnesses would be helpful to a reasonable jury, the judge
should be able to admit that testimony.124
In this situation, it is improper for the judge to decide, as presently
mandated by Tome, that the motive existed, when it existed, and that it affected
the child's reports of abuse. Those are jury questions,125 and the jury ought to

123

Thirteen states filed an amicus brief in support of the United States in Tome, arguing:
In the context of such cases, the defense will always be able to devise some alleged
motive for the child to lie. In cases of abuse, it may well be simply that the child

would prefer not to have contact with the defendant, which would certainly be
expected in such cases, or perhaps that the child is alleged to desire attention. See,
e.g., State v. Robinson, 611 A.2d 852 (Vt. 1992). Such alleged motives to lie, which
may be weak motives at best or may have little or no obvious or recent origin, could
readily permit the defense to remove any possibility that prior consistent statements
made by the child victim -- no matter how probative the circumstances in which they
were made -- could be admitted at trial. Such a result would plainly disserve the
substantial state interest, recognized in many decisions of this Court, in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of children.
Brief for the States of Ohio, et aI., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Tome v. United States,
513 U.S. 150 (1995) (No. 93-6892).
124 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14.
125 See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
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have the prior consistent statements that would help it in evaluating whether the
event happened as the child testified at trial, or whether the child fabricated it.
These are difficult cases, and the judge should be able to give the jury whatever
evidence it will find reasonably helpful and probative. The fact-finder's need for
this information is particularly acute when the witness is a young child victim, as
such children are especialll vulnerable when testifying in an intimidating and
un supportive atmosphere. 12
D. Specifics of Proposed Amendment of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
Current Rule 801(d)(1)(B)'s underinclusiveness results in a confusing twotrack system of admissibility for a testifying witness's prior consistent
statements: some are admissible as substantive evidence; others mal be
admissible for the limited purpose of rehabilitating a witness's credibility.12 But
under the current scheme, the latter must be excluded pursuant to Rule 403 even
for that limited purpose if the court concludes the jury is likely to use them as
substantive evidence instead. 128 Because the current Rule artificially excludes
some helpful prior consistent statements, this approach can unnecessarily result
in reversible error. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be amended to permit the trial court
judge to admit a witness's prior consistent statements that are helpful to rebut his
or her impeachment. 129 The proffered statements should first be evaluated by the
judge under Rule 104(a)130 as to whether they meet the relevancy requirements of
Rules 401 and 402; if so, the statements should be subject to exclusion, in the

126 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 153-54; Lawson v. State, 865 A2d 617, 631 (Md. App. 2005); Daigle,
supra note 109, at 93 (children's testimony is "often unclear or incomplete"); Friedman, supra note
29, at 277 ("Often the child who charges that an adult abused her is unable to testify at trial, or at
least unable to testify effectively under standard procedures."); Gail S. Goodman et al., Child
Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause: The American Psychological Association Brief in
Maryland v. Craig, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 13 (1991); Jones, supra note 85, at 491-92 & nn.199201.
127 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
128 FED. R. EVID. 403, advisory committee's note (advising courts to consider the effectiveness of a
limiting instruction under Rule 105 when deciding whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403).
See supra note 6.
129 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 515 (citing, inter alia, Ellicott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at
439; Ryan v. UPS, 205 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1953); People v. Walsh, 301 P.2d 247, 250-51 (Cal.
1956); People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711-12 (N.Y. 1949».
130 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 154 ("The trial court admitted all of the statements over defense counsel's
objection, accepting the Government's argument that they rebutted the implicit charge that AT.'s
testimony was motivated by a desire to live with her mother."); id. at 176 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("In this case, the Court of Appeals decided ... that AT.'s prior consistent statements were
probative on the question of whether her story as a witness reflected a motive to lie. There is no
reason to reevaluate this factbound conclusion."); United States v. Toney, 161 F.3d 404,408 (6th
Cir. 1998) ("The district court's determination of when the motive to lie arose is a factual finding,
which we review under the 'clearly erroneous' standard.").
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court's discretion under Rules 403 or 611 (a)(2), 13l if they are unnecessarily
cumulative.
This amendment would do awai with the need for limiting instructions that
are so baffiing as to be ineffective. \3 As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has pointed out repeatedly, "The credibility/substance
distinction is illusory in this context. ,,133
The question of helpfulness is first a question of relevance under Rules 40 I
and 402 as to rehabilitation of the declarant in light of the impeachment that has
been undertaken. 134 Statements lacking probative value as to that purpose should
be exc1uded. 135 In making this determination, however, it is essential that the
court refrain from finding whether a particular motive that is contested by the

See supra notes 75-77, 114, 116 and accompanying text.
E.g., United States v. Copes, 345 F.2d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (quoting United States v.
DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964)). Even the defense lawyers' association arguing in support of
the petitioner in Tome conceded this point, stating in its brief:
13l

132

The only change adopted by the Rule in 1975 is that the prior consistent statements,
once admitted, could be given substantive effect. This was a relatively minor change
that realistically had little effect, since most juries were probably ill-equipped to treat
a prior consistent statement as "rehabilitative", yet to understand that it was not to be
considered as "substantive evidence". The change simply did away with a distinction
that meant nothing to juries anyway.
Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) (No. 93-6892) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). See supra note 108 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 61-63.
133 United States v. Beltran, 165 F.3d 1266, 1273 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., concurring). See
United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The Rule [801(d)(I)(B)] thus
does not change the type of statements that may be admitted; its only effect is to admit these
statements [that are relevant under Rule 402 and pass muster under Rule 403] as substantive
evidence rather than solely for the purpose of rehabilitation.").
134 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 157-58.
[T]he question is whether A. T.'s out-of-court statements rebutted the alleged link
between her desire to be with her mother and her testimony, not whether they
suggested that A.T.'s in-court testimony was true. The Rule speaks of a party
rebutting an alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story told.
[d. In the cited passage, the Court's intended meaning seems to be that the prior statements are
admissible to rebut the influence of an alleged motive, not simply to bolster the declarant's
testimony by repeating its substance.
135 See, e.g., United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1316-17 (lIth Cir. 2005) (defendant's prior
consistent statement, telling his son, after his arrest, that he had merely been "role-playing" with a
federal agent was properly excluded).
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declarant exists. To do so would "usurp the jury's function.,,136 Rather, the court
should consider whether the prior consistent statement might be helpful to the
jury in determining if the motive to lie existed. 137 Reliability will be tested by
cross-examination of the declarant at trial. If the court concludes that prior
consistent statement evidence would be helpful, it should consider whether to
limit, under Rule 611(a), the mode of proof to be used. 138 The admissibility of
more than one statement, even if otherwise admissible under the rule, should be
within the court's discretion.139 The erroneous admission of prior consistent

136 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 102. Cf United
States v; Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769,777 (2d Cir. 1983) (credibility of in-court witnesses is solely
a question for the jury).
137 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 511 ("The [premotive] rule can hamper the jury's factfinding mission by placing an often crucial factual determination where it does not belong-in the
hands of the trial judge."). As Judge Bullock explains:

Sometimes, a trial judge may find that the motive arose and the prior consistent
statement was made on particular dates when a different fact-finder could reasonably
choose different dates. This results in a trial judge sometimes finding a prior
consistent statement to be made postmotive when a jury could reasonably find it to be
made premotive, or vice-versa. Prior consistent statements that may rehabilitate
should not be excluded in such circumstances. This situation could be rectified by
using the Second Circuit's Grunewald standard: If it is "reasonably possible for the
jury to say that the prior consistent statements did in fact antedate the motive
disclosed on the cross-examination, the court should not exclude them." ....
Additionally, it is often difficult for the trial court to pin down the date when a
charged improper influence or motive arose or the date when a statement was made.
Frequently, and particularly in criminal drug trials, witnesses cannot remember even
the month in which a particular event occurred. Evidence concerning when an
improper influence or motive arose and when a particular prior consistent statement
was made may be scant. The trial judge should be free to allow the jury to weigh the
evidence under all the circumstances without being bound by a restrictive time-line
rule.
!d. at 537-38 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd on
other grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)) (emphasis added). See id. at 515 (citing cases). See also
United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1979) (whether motive to falsify existed
at time of statement may well be for the jury to decide). But see, e.g., United States v. Prieto, 232
F.3d 816, 819-22 (11th Cir. 2000) (trial judge determines, as an "individualized and careful
calibration of complex fact," when a motive to fabricate came into existence). See also supra notes
81-82 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 76.
139 See United States v. Copes, 345 F.2d 723, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (no error in admitting
extrinsic evidence, through testimony of two other witnesses, of victim-witness's prior consistent
statements, when defense had impugned her credibility).

Tome characterized as "rather weak" the charge that A.T. had fabricated her testimony
so that she could live with her mother, and it complained that "the Government was
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statements is most often found to be hannless because the evidence is blo
definition cumulative of a testifying witness's in-court, sworn testimony. 1 0
Tome is the exception: the Court reasoned that the error was reversible because
the child victim's court testimony was weak, and the prosecution had
"present[ed] a parade of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more
than recount [the child's] detailed out-of-court statements to them.,,141
In Tome the trial judge permitted six witnesses to testify regarding the
child's prior consistent statements: a babysitter, the child's mother who
overheard the statements to the babysitter on one of two dates to which the
babysitter testified, a social worker, and three pediatricians. 142 The defense made
no objection to one doctor's testimony; the other two doctors' testimony was
admitted under Rule 803(4) (recognizing a hearsay exception for statements
made by a person seeking medical diagnosis or treatment)/43 but the United
States Court of Appeals upheld the admission of all the statements under Rule
80l(d)(1)(B).I44 Thus, as the case was presented to the Supreme Court, six
witnesses, but not the child, testified under Rule 801(d)(I)(B) to the child's outof-court statements.
Though this author would quarrel with the Court's arguable implication that
the jury did not understand that the underlying question was the child's
credibility, the calling of so many witnesses under Rule 801 (d)( 1)(B) does strike
one as excessive. The best way to address this issue is through considered use of
Rules 403 and 611. The trial court should exercise its discretion to exclude
unduly cumulative testimony if it would cause unnecessary delay or likely result
in unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs the added probative value the
testimony would bring to the proceedings. In the Tome situation, in response to a
Rule 403 or 611(a)(2) objection, or on its own motion, the trial judge should
ordinarily restrict the extrinsic evidence of the witness's prior consistent
statements to one or two other witnesses. If the witness's prior consistent
statements have been admitted under another hearsay exception, such as Rule
803(4), the court should take that into account as well.
pennitted to present a parade of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more
than recount A.T.'s detailed out-of-court statements to them." Now suppose A.T. had
made all those statements at a time when, so far as she knew, a change of custody
arrangements was not in the offing. Satisfaction of the premotive requirement might
mean that the earlier statements more clearly rebut the fabrication charge-but that
charge would be just as weak as in the actual case, meaning that the parade of
witnesses would be, if anything, even less necessary and appropriate. Presumably the
Court would not object to the trial court's exercise of discretion to admit only one
prior statement in rebuttal.
Friedman, supra note 29, at 317 (footnote omitted).
140 See supra note 62.
141 513 U.S. at 165. See United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding error in
case before it to be harmless, where testifying witness proved his own prior consistent statement).
142
513 U.S. at 154.
143 [d. at 154-55.
144 [d. at 155.
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In child abuse cases, a perspicacious juror would most like to hear the
child's initial complaint and to learn under what circumstances it was made. For
example, if the complaint was made to a parent, the juror may like to see that
parent testify and be cross-examined as to any motive to coach the child.
Hearing a witness, such as a police officer, social worker, or psychologist, who
heard a subsequent consistent statement by the child would not be as persuasive
to that juror if the juror had not had the opportunity to assess for himself the
credibility of the first report.
Yet crafting a rule (like Louisiana's rule permitting the substantive use of a
consistent "initial complaint of sexually assaultive behavior"145) to admit only the
child's "initial" prior consistent statement is unsatisfactory. How can we ever be
sure that the earliest statement the lawyer knows about was the "initial" report?
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be amended to provide:
A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statement is ... consistent with the declarant's testimony and is af'feFed ta
rebut would be helpful to the trier of fact in assessing what effect. if any, to
give to impeachment, such as by a prior inconsistent statement, or an express
or implied charge against the declarant of memory loss, reeeat-fabrication~ or
improper influence aF mati'le .... 146

Judge Bullock, an experienced trial judge, has called for a substantively similar
amendment. 147 Impeachment would remain a condition precedent to possible
admission of a prior consistent statement under this Rule. 148 The suggested
added language to the Rule is intended to facilitate application by the trial judge
and the fashioning of an appropriate jury instruction, if such evidence is
admitted. 149 The "such as" phrase is used in the event that the drafter did not

LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 801 (D)(l)(d) (1995).
FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(I)(B). Deletions from current Rule 801(d)(l)(B) are shown by strikethroughs and additions are shown by underlining.
147 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 534.
145

146

First, the amendment should reject the per se time-line premotive rule and allow the
admission of prior consistent statements where the statements are relevant and have
value but are inadmissible under the Tome Court's interpretation of Rule
801(d)(I)(B). Second, the amendment should expressly provide for the admission of
prior consistent statements as substantive evidence in all cases where such statements
are admissible for rehabilitation.
Id. at 537 ("The suggestions made in this Article will not change the result in the vast majority of
situations, but will refocus the inquiry regarding the admission of prior coIi:sistent statements where
it belongs-on relevancy.").
148 E.g., United States v. Smith, 746 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984).
149 Professor Graham's pre-Tome proposal for amendment of Rule 801(d)(l)(B), like the proposal
in this article, addressed several forms of impeachment, but used the following language:
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foresee all possible methods of impeachment that can be rebutted in this way. ISO
"Improper motive" is deleted as redundant to "fabrication."
"Improper
influence" is retained but repositioned, as its application in a non-"fabrication"
context would be when one is impeached by the notion that one's bias affected
one's perception or memory. In this situation, a prior consistent statement when
one had no bias could refute the impeachment.
The Committee Note should point out the need for the court to employ
Rules 403 and 611 and to exercise its discretion lSI to curtail unnecessarily
cumulative evidence, so as to avoid the prejudicial effect the Court's majority
found in Tome.152 The proposed rule does not mention Rule 403 or Rule 611 in

A statement is not hearsay if.. . [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is . . .
[c]onsistent with his testimony and the statement (i) rebuts an express or implied
charge against him of partiality, (ii) supports an explanation or denial of a charge
against him of self-contradiction, or (iii) rebuts an express or implied charge against
him of lack of recollection or contrivance accompanying a charge of selfcontradiction.
Graham, supra note 54, at 616.
150 See, e.g., MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (stating that a statement is not hearsay ifit is "consistent
with the declarant's testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant's
credibility as a witness").
151 See Daigle, supra note 109, at III ("Permitting judicial discretion in the admissibility of postmotive prior consistent statements is appropriate .... A relevancy inquiry, where the value of the
statement is balanced against the risks of admission, can competently address concerns about the
cumulative or prejudicial effect of a child's statements."); Friedman, supra note 29, at 315.
First the court should assess the rebuttal value of the prior statement. Rebuttal value
requires both need to rebut the charge and effectiveness in doing so. Ordinarily, but
not inevitably, a statement made after the alleged improper influence arose will not be
effective in rebutting the charge that the witness's trial testimony is the product of the
influence. Second, if the prior statement appears to have substantial rebuttal value,
the court should consider factors weighing against admissibility of the statement.
These include expenditure of time and, if the prior statement includes an overhang of
assertions not included in the witness's trial testimony, the prejudice that this
potentially creates, especially in hindering the party opponent's ability to crossexamine the witness with respect to those statements. If the negative factors are
substantial, the court should consider excluding the statement, redacting the statement,
or otherwise limiting the information that may be presented about it or the use that the
jury may make of it.
!d. But see Daniel J. Capra, Prior Consistent Statements and the Supreme Court, 213 N.Y.L.J. 3,

37 (1995) (arguing that allowing judges discretion as to admissibility of post-motive statements
would result in the defendant's being "subject to all kinds of bolstering statements").
152 See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 165 (1995).
If the Rule were to permit the introduction of prior statements as substantive evidence

to rebut every implicit charge that a witness' in-court testimony results from recent
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its text because those Rules potentially apply to all situations that are not
governed by a mandatory rule. To mention Rules 403 and 611 in one Rule might
misleadingly suggest that they were inapplicable to others.153

fabrication or improper influence or motive, the whole emphasis of the trial could
shift to the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones. The present case illustrates
the point. In response to a rather weak charge that A.T.'s testimony was a fabrication
created so the child could remain with her mother, the Government was permitted to
present a parade of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more than recount
A.T.'s detailed out-of-court statements to them .... At closing argument before the
jury, the Government placed great reliance on the prior statements for substantive
purposes but did not once seek to use them to rebut the impact of the alleged motive.

Id. Professor Friedman would apply his approach to the Tome facts as follows:
How would this system work in Tome? If, as both the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court believed, the charge of improper influence was a weak one, the need
for rebuttal was correspondingly weak. The spontaneity of A.T.'s first statement, to
her babysitter Rocha, might give that statement some rebuttal value, notwithstanding
that the statement was made after the alleged influence arose. The subsequent pretrial
statements, made after interrogation of A.T. began, have far less rebuttal value, and
their incremental value would be less still if the first statement were admitted.
Moreover, it was principally the subsequent statements that added information not
contained in A.T.'s trial testimony. Though the first statement-"my father gets drunk
and he thinks I'm his wife"-added some substance to the current testimony, this could
easily be suppressed from Rocha's testimony. Thus, the trial court could have
decided to admit the first statement, in some form, but not the others. I do not mean
to suggest that this outcome would be indubitably correct, only that it would be
plausible, within the trial court's discretion.
Friedman, supra note 29, at 315-16 (footnotes omitted). As to Professor Friedman's point about
suppressing the babysitter's testimony that the four-year-old child had said, "[M]y father gets drunk
and thinks I'm his wife," this author would argue that the indirect phraseology added probative
value for the jury that would be useful to it in its task of deciding the likelihood that the statement
was made as a result of the child's lying scheme to be removed from the father's home, and thus
whether the child's trial testimony also sprang from such a poisoned well. Id.
153 In this regard the proposed language differs from the model draft that Prof. Capra submitted to
the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, reflecting Judge Bullock's proposal (see supra notes
14 and 147). That draft read:
A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . .
consistent with the declarant's testimony and is efferes te rebet !Hi e*flress er implies
saarge agamst the sesl8l'8Bt ef reseat fabrisaliea er ilRflreper iaf.lHease er meti'le
admissible. subject to Rule 403. to rehabilitate the declarant's credibilitv as a witness.

Capra Memorandum, supra note 14.
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The Committee Note also should explain that the amendment is not
intended to change the case law under the current Rule that permits extrinsic
evidence of the prior statement, as long as the declarant also testifies and is
subject to cross-examination about the statement. 154 Because the old common
law reluctance to let a declarant testify to his own prior consistent statement has
faded from view/ 55 the Committee ought to suggest, however, that if the
impeachment has occurred on cross-examination, the better practice ordinarily is
to first raise the prior statement on the redirect of the declarant.. 156
Finally, the Committee Note should remind its readers that Rule
801(d)(1)(B) does not restrict admission of evidence under other Rules, such as
the rule of completeness codified in Rule 106. 157
E. Other Alternatives
If an agreement cannot be reached that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be
amended in the manner proposed, then at least two other alternatives, besides
inaction, remain. The less desirable alternative would simply be to make clear
that failure of a prior consistent statement to fit within Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does

See supra note 50.
See, e.g., People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710 (N.Y. 1949); State v. George, 30 N.C. 324 (1848) (per
curiam) (discussing reluctance but pennitting such proof) (over dissent).
156 See Graham, supra note 54, at 618-19 (stating that the "introduction of the consistent statement
initially through the testimony of the declarant best serves the interests of justice," as well as the
witness's "convenience"). Professor Friedman points out that the child in Tome was excused from
the stand before the prosecution offered evidence of prior statements, which left the defense unable
to cross-examine the child further as to them, unless it recalled her to the stand, which it did not, for
legitimate tactical reasons. Friedman, supra note 29, at 300-01. Yet the defense already had
solicited from the child either a denial or a showing of a failure of memory. The situation in Tome
was atypical in that the declarant had first been examined about the statements on crossexamination. See supra note 29 (citing United States v. Owens) and note 50. It
was
defense
counsel who first brought up the question of the child witness's prior statements (likely in an effort
to suggest that she had been coached). The child "testified [on cross-examination] that the only
person with whom she had discussed the alleged abuse was the prosecutor. Tr. 145. The child
denied that she ever spoke with her babysitter about the alleged abuse; she either failed to respond
or stated that she was unable to remember when asked about other out-of-court statements
concerning the alleged abuse. Tr. 152-53." Brief for the Petitioner, at 5, Tome v. United States,
513 U.S. 150 (1995) (No. 93-6892); Reply Brief for Petitioner, Tome v. United States, 513 U.S.
.
150 (1995) (No. 93-6892).
157 See United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 626 (4th Cir. 2003) (prior consistent statements were
admitted properly under the rule of completeness); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir.
1979). But see Judith A. Archer, Note, Prior Consistent Statements: Temporal Admissibility
Standard Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(B), 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 759, 780-83 (1987)
(arguing that Rule 106 does not pennit substantive use of the prior statement, so that Rule
801(d)(I)(B) should apply). Note that, under the proposal made in this article, the availability of
Rule 106 as another avenue of admissibility would not preclude admissibility under Rule
801(d)(I)(B) of a statement that rebuts either a charge of fabrication or impeachment by prior
inconsistent statement.
154

ISS
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not preclude admission for the limited purpose of rehabilitation of a witness's
credibility. Amendment of Rule 613 to this effect (using language like that of
Maryland Rule 5-616(c)(2),t58 for example) would achieve this result, though it
would continue the two-track approach to admissibility and the need for limiting
instructions 159 and would not assuage concomitant resulting confusion.
In recognition of the fact that many jurors view sexual allegations with
special suspicion,160 it would be preferable to complement this general, less-thanideal approach by adding a special rule permitting the admissibility, as
substantive evidence, of prior consistent complaints of sexual assault when the
victim testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
complaint. Though this approach may be criticized on the ground that society
should not be automatically suspect of allegations of sexual assault,161 the
common law rule admitting "prompt" complaints of rape (by definition, then,
prior to the victim's trial testimony) has had practical and beneficial effects for
victims in many prosecutions. 162 The common law rule's codification in
Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (d), 163 for example, and its extension there to all sexual
assaults, including child abuse, has permitted the admission of some of a child's
prior consistent statements as substantive evidence when they would not have
been admissible under Tome's construction of Rule 801(d)(1)(B).I64
The requirement of "promptness" is not without its difficulties as many
sexual assault victims, especially young victims, are reluctant to confide in
anyone about the assault. Their hesitation may result from fear of the abuser,
shame, or simply a lack of understanding that what has happened to them is
wrong. 165 Therefore, deletion of the promptness requirement and a provision

158 Maryland Rule 5-616(c)(2) provides: "A witness whose credibility has been attacked may be
rehabilitated by ... [e]xcept as provided by statute, evidence of the witness' prior statements that
are consistent with the witness' present testimony, when their having been made detracts from the
impeachment. ... " MD. RULE 5-616(c)(2).
159 Holmes v. State, 712 A.2d 554 (Md. 1998).
160 See, e.g., Parker v. State, 846 A.2d 485, 494-95 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), cert. denied, 855
A.2d 350 (Md. 2004); Cole v. State, 574 A.2d 326, 331-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
161 See, e.g., Kathryn M. Starich, The Paradox a/the Prompt Complaint Rule, 37 B.C. L. REv. 441,
443-44 (1996).
162 See, e.g., Gaerian v. State, 860 A.2d 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (upholding admission of
evidence); Parker v. State, 846 A.2d 485 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (semble); Robinson v. State,
827 A.2d 167 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (semble), cert. denied, 833 A.2d 32 (Md. 2003); Nelson v.
State, 768 A.2d 738 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (semble); Terry v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 614
(Va. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding admission of evidence under Va. Code Ann. § 19-2-268.2).
163 Maryland Rule 5-802.1(d) provides-under the same preconditions as Federal Rule 801(d)(I),
that the declarant testify at the trial and be subject to cross-examination concerning the statementfor the admissibility as substantive evidence of "[a] statement that is one of prompt complaint of
sexually assaultive behavior to which the declarant was subjected if the statement is consistent with
the declarant's testimony." MD. RULE 5-802.1(d). See LYNN McLAIN, 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE:
STATE AND FEDERAL § 801(3):2 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2004). A complete discussion of this Rule
and its corollaries in a vast majority of the states is beyond the scope of this article.
164 E.g., Gaerian v. State, 860 A.2d 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
165 E.g., State v. Bethune, 578 A.2d 364, 366-68 (N.J. 1990).
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instead for the admissibility of any prior consistent complaint of sexual assault,
subject to Rules 403 and 611, would be fairer.
Of course, rather than a Rule change addressing only sexual assaults, it
would be preferable to amend Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to create a properly flexible rule
that would work well for all types of situations by permitting the substantive use
of all relevant prior consistent statements, subject to exclusion in the court's
discretion under Rules 403 and 611.

v.

CONCLUSION

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(I)(B)'s underinclusiveness regarding
admissibility, as substantive evidence, of a witness's out-of-court statements
consistent with the witness's in-court testimony, has resulted in an unsatisfactory
and inefficient dual track system for admissibility. Under the current approach
many prior consistent statements must carefully be admitted only for the limited
purpose of rehabilitating the witness's credibility-else reversible error may
result. 166 This two-tiered system is constitutionally unnecessary, as Crawford has
recently affirmed that the Confrontation Clause is met by the witness's testifying
and being subject to cross-examination at the trial. 167 The best way to prevent the
unnecessary creation of error when a witness's prior consistent statements are
admitted for substantive purposes, rather than for the limited purpose of
evaluating the credibility of the witness's in-court testimony, is to amend the
Rule to permit the substantive use of prior consistent statements that the trial
court finds, under Rule 104(a), would be helpful to the fact-finder.
The Rule should be amended to permit the admission, subject to Rule 403,
of all prior consistent statements that a jury would reasonably find helpful in
assessing what weight to give to the witness's trial testimony. If an opponent's
allegation that a witness has a motive to lie is neither based on an objective fact
that the witness concedes to be true, nor can be traced to a determinable time that
would have provided a window for earlier statements on the topic, the judge
ordinarily should permit the jury to hear one or two of the witness's prior
consistent statements, to aid it in deciding whether such a motive existed and
affected the witness's testimony.
Short of such an amendment, the Federal Rules of Evidence should be
amended to include a hearsay exception for prior consistent complaints of sexual
assault and to explicitly provide for limited admissibility, as to credibility, of a
testifying witness's other prior consistent statements that do not qualify under
Rule 801(d)(I)(B) but are nonetheless helpful to an evaluation of the witness's
credibility.

166 E.g., United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071, 1080-82 (8th Cir. 2005) (reversible error to admit
extrinsic evidence under Rule 801(d)(I)(B) rather than for limited purpose of rehabilitating child
abuse victim's credibility). See supra note 6.
167 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

